Fortress Europe – defence sector M&A
Authors
This article is an extract from the CMS European M&A Outlook 2026. To download the full report please click here
Europe’s defence sector – spanning traditional industries such as aerospace, naval engineering, armoured vehicles and munitions, as well as emerging arenas like space defence, autonomous systems and AI – has long been characterised by its strategic importance and complex regulatory frameworks.
Shifting geopolitical alignments, driven by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and widening Middle East tensions, have sharpened the focus on military preparedness, prompting Western governments to channel funds into advanced weaponry, cybersecurity and cross-border security co-operation.
At the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, allies committed to raise defence spending to 5% of GDP by 2035, with at least 3.5% for core military expenditure and up to 1.5% for broader defence-related investments such as infrastructure and cybersecurity. Germany is set to be a leading spender, with plans to boost its defence budget from around 2.4% of GDP in 2025 to 3.5% by 2029, its most ambitious rearmament effort since reunification.
Nine transactions targeting European defence sector assets were announced in H1 2025, with disclosed values totaling around EUR 650 million (transaction values were not disclosed for all deals). While this figure is broadly in line with the same period last year (11 deals, EUR 691 million) and represents a marked increase from H2 2024 (EUR 257 million across eight deals), the raw numbers show a disconnect between market hype and real transaction activity. Despite the major political commitments to boost defence spending, M&A volumes remain flat year-on-year. This reflects four main constraints in the European market.
First is the issue of procurement lag. Though defence budgets have increased since 2022, contractors are only now moving through multi-year procurement cycles, delaying acquisition demand. Related to this is the second matter of asset scarcity and, in turn, high valuations, particularly for prime targets tied to AI, precision systems and advanced materials. Regulatory hurdles are the third key constraint, with stricter FDI screening and fragmented export controls slowing cross-border M&A and extending approval times. Lastly is the question of integration risk, given how sensitive technology transfers, IP ringfencing and classified work segregation can raise costs and complexity in dealmaking.
If procurement bottlenecks ease in H2 2025, deal volumes could rise modestly in 2026, led by targeted acquisitions in high-tech subsectors and regionally strategic industries. Any such increase, however, is likely to be gradual, constrained by regulatory complexity, asset scarcity and integration risks.
Geographic hotspots
Of the defence M&A deals announced in Europe in H1 2025, a sizeable share involved Nordic targets. Specifically, three of the nine H1 deal targets were based in Finland, Sweden and Norway. We expect the Nordics to continue to be particularly active in defence dealmaking over the coming year. With Finland having joined NATO in 2023, closely followed by Sweden in 2024 (ending more than 200 years of military non-alignment), these countries are committed to increased defence spending driven by heightened security concerns around the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.
Several other countries are also emerging as key players in European defence M&A. Poland has significantly ramped up its defence spending and is actively pursuing industrial partnerships. Germany also stands out with its ambitious rearmament programme and growing role in cross-border acquisitions and joint ventures. The UK, under its Strategic Defence Review and new UK-EU pact, is fostering innovation and cross-border dealmaking, particularly among SMEs. Ukraine, meanwhile, is rapidly becoming a strategic partner and innovation hub, with battlefield-driven technologies, growing integration into EU defence frameworks and a surge in domestic and outbound M&A activity.
Top five defence deals, H1 2025
| Announced date | Target company | Subsector | Target country | Acquirer | Deal value EURm | |
| 1 | 11/02/2025 | RENK Group AG (18.4% Stake) | Armoured vehicles, Automotive components, Industrial equipment and machinery | Germany | KNDS Deutschland GmbH & Co KG | 413 |
| 2 | 29/01/2025 | Summa Defence Oy (100% Stake) | Armoured vehicles | Finland | Meriaura Oy | 188 |
| 3 | 19/05/2025 | Polska Grupa Militarna SA | Aerospace, Missiles and missile guidance systems, Small arms manufacturing | Poland | Fidera Ltd | 23 |
| 4 | 18/03/2025 | Pangea Aerospace SL | Missiles and missile guidance systems | Spain | Centre For Technological Development & Innovation; Primo Capital SGR SpA; Hyperion Fund Inc; Andre-Hubert Roussel (Private Individual) | 23 |
| 5 | 16/06/2025 | AMMUNITY SIA (100% Stake) | Small arms manufacturing | Latvia | Scandinavian Astor Group AB | 3 |
US engagement
Tensions between Washington and Brussels have intensified Europe’s push for defence autonomy. The largest deal of H1 2025 involved Franco-German defence contractor KNDS exercising its option to acquire an additional 18.4% stake in Bavaria-based tank gearbox manufacturer RENK Group for EUR 413 million. The remaining eight transactions also featured European bidders, underscoring the “buy European” approach championed in the 2024 Draghi report. That report urged a reduction in reliance on non-EU suppliers, highlighting that the majority of EU defence spending still flows to external contractors, particularly in the US. In response to this shift towards European consolidation and autonomy, US defence contractors keen to remain involved in EU defence projects are actively adapting their strategies to secure a share of the continent’s expanding defence budget.
US companies like Honeywell and Anduril are investing in European subsidiaries and acquiring local firms to establish a credible, long-term presence in the region. Honeywell’s acquisition of Italy’s Civitanavi Systems, for instance, not only brought advanced navigation technology into its portfolio but also provided a manufacturing base within the EU – critical for meeting EU funding requirements around IP control and local production.
US defence firms are also forming joint ventures and subcontracting relationships with European primes and, increasingly, the growing ecosystem of start-ups and SMEs. Lockheed Martin’s collaboration with Poland on the HOMAR-A system and its HIMARS sustainment centre in Romania, as well as its partnership with Rheinmetall to develop the GMARS launcher in Germany, demonstrate this strategic adaptation.
Partnerships are carefully structured to enable US firms to contribute advanced or non-sensitive technologies while ensuring that design authority, production control and access to classified capabilities remain within Europe – an essential condition for compliance with EU sovereignty protocols and eligibility for certain EU funding mechanisms. Such collaborations are particularly active in AI, autonomous systems and cyber defence, where European initiatives like EDF and PESCO are driving innovation and industrial resilience.
Beyond regulatory compliance, US defence firms are increasingly prioritising co-development and cultural alignment with European partners. Executives stress the importance of “acting like an EU company” – embedding engineering, R&D and manufacturing within Europe to build trust and long-term credibility. This approach is essential for aligning with EU frameworks such as the SAFE Regulation, which mandates that at least 65% of a defence product’s component cost must originate from entities in the EU, EEA-EFTA states or Ukraine. SAFE also requires local infrastructure, executive management and design autonomy, making cultural and operational integration a strategic necessity for accessing EU funding.
While direct access to EU defence funding programmes remains limited, US firms can leverage NATO procurement frameworks and bilateral agreements with individual EU member states to maintain market access. Ongoing transatlantic dialogues, such as the US-EU Security and Defence Dialogue, reflect growing interest in establishing a formal EU-US Security and Defence Partnership. If realised, such a framework could eventually pave the way for trusted partner status or tailored exemptions under EU procurement rules.
Looking ahead to 2026, we expect to see a continuation of defence consolidation within Europe, alongside a gradual reduction in direct US participation in EU-funded defence projects. Joint ventures will remain in vogue – primarily among European partners but also involving US firms that meet the necessary compliance and eligibility standards.
Role of private equity
Rising defence budgets and Europe’s push for industrial consolidation are creating attractive opportunities for PE investors. PE firms are increasingly active in defence M&A, particularly in building competitive European groups through acquisitions in dual-use or less politically sensitive areas – such as aerospace components, electronics, logistics, and support services – while investments in core weapon systems and highly sensitive technologies remain limited. However, there is a growing trend toward incorporating security considerations into ESG criteria, driven by heightened geopolitical tensions and the strategic importance of defence investments.
We expect PE interest in defence tech start-ups and scaleups to continue to grow in 2026, especially in AI, unmanned systems and cyber defence. These areas combine agility, commercial viability and fewer procurement constraints, making them attractive to private capital. While Europe still trails the US in overall PE defence investment, momentum is building. Dedicated funds like Tikehau’s Defense et Securite and Weinberg’s Eirene Fund are gaining traction, supported by EU initiatives such as Readiness 2030, which aims to mobilise private capital to strengthen Europe’s defence industrial base.
Defence intricacies
M&A in Europe’s defence sector is shaped by a uniquely intricate landscape of regulatory, political and operational hurdles. Dealmakers must contend with fragmented export controls, with rules differing not only between EU member states but also in their interpretation and enforcement. These controls can restrict the transfer of sensitive technologies, delay approvals and complicate cross-border integration, particularly in deals involving dual-use assets or classified capabilities.
Relatedly, many European jurisdictions have strengthened their FDI regimes in recent years, allowing governments to block or impose stringent conditions on acquisitions of defence-related assets, especially by non-EU investors. These reviews can significantly extend deal timelines, increase costs and introduce execution risk.
Deals involving classified contracts or sensitive technologies require rigorous safeguards. Buyers may need to establish “clean teams”, secure national security clearances and implement ring-fenced IT systems to protect confidential data and comply with defence ministry protocols. Cybersecurity risks are also increasingly material, with acquirers needing to assess target vulnerabilities and ensure post-deal resilience. Similarly, in the case of joint ventures or cross-border collaborations, it is critical that design authority and control over critical technology systems remain within compliant jurisdictions to ensure access to EU funding and uphold strategic autonomy.
Despite these hurdles, the defence sector remains attractive for well-prepared investors and acquirers. Success depends on proactive regulatory engagement, robust due diligence and strategic alignment with national and EU defence priorities. In an environment where security imperatives are reshaping industrial policy, M&A can serve as a powerful tool to accelerate innovation, enhance resilience and strengthen Europe’s collective defence capabilities.