Czech competition law reform: more powers for the authority, more risks for managers

The Czech Office for the Protection of Competition (ÚOHS) has proposed a major amendment to the Czech Competition Act that could significantly reshape competition enforcement in the Czech Republic. 

The proposal introduces several entirely new tools and powers — from market-wide interventions to direct sanctions against company managers involved in cartels.

If adopted, the reform would represent one of the most important changes to Czech competition law in recent years.

A new power to intervene directly in markets

Probably the most discussed part of the proposal is the introduction of a so-called “new competition tool”.

Until now, ÚOHS could mainly intervene against specific unlawful conduct — such as cartels, abuse of dominance or problematic mergers. Under the proposed reform, the authority would also gain powers to intervene in markets where competition does not function effectively even without a clear infringement by a particular company. 

This could apply, for example, to highly concentrated oligopolistic markets or markets dominated by a strong “price-setting” player.

After conducting a market investigation, ÚOHS could impose broad corrective measures through a general regulatory decision. These measures could include obligations to:

• provide access to data, networks or interfaces; 
• introduce transparent and non-discriminatory standards; or 
• amend certain contractual arrangements or market practices. 

In extreme cases, the proposal even contemplates structural remedies, including forced divestments of part of a business. 

This would move Czech competition enforcement closer to trends already visible at EU level and in several other European jurisdictions.

Managers could face personal liability for cartels

Another headline change is the proposed possibility to sanction individuals directly for cartel conduct.

While cartel agreements are already prohibited under Czech law, enforcement has traditionally focused mainly on companies themselves. The new proposal would allow ÚOHS to pursue specific managers or individuals who actively organised or participated in cartel arrangements. 

The reform also introduces a form of leniency programme for individuals, intended to motivate individuals to come forward and cooperate with the authority. 

For management teams, this is an important reminder that competition compliance is increasingly becoming a personal issue, not only a corporate one.

Fewer merger filings — but more uncertainty for some deals

The amendment would also significantly change Czech merger control rules.

On the positive side for businesses, the turnover thresholds for mandatory merger notifications would increase for the first time in more than 20 years:

• the combined turnover threshold would rise from CZK 1.5 billion to CZK 2.5 billion (approx. EUR 100 million); and 
• the individual turnover threshold from CZK 250 million to CZK 350 million (approx. EUR 15 million). 

According to ÚOHS, this could reduce the number of notified mergers by approximately 30%, especially in transactions with little or no impact on competition. 

At the same time, however, the authority proposes introducing a “call-in” model. This would allow ÚOHS to review certain transactions that fall below the standard merger control turnover thresholds, where the transaction could nevertheless raise competition concerns. 

This type of mechanism already exists in several EU Member States and reflects growing regulatory attention to acquisitions involving innovative or strategically important businesses.

Stronger investigative powers

The proposal would also expand ÚOHS investigative powers.

The authority could gain access to selected datasets held by other public institutions, such as the Czech National Bank or the Czech Statistical Office. 

Perhaps even more controversially, the amendment would allow ÚOHS — subject to prior court approval — to obtain certain operational and location data relating to mobile devices from telecom providers during cartel investigations. 

The stated goal is to improve cartel detection in situations where direct written evidence is unavailable.

What should companies watch for?

The proposal is still in the legislative process and may evolve further.

Nevertheless, the direction is already clear: Czech competition enforcement is expected to become more interventionist, more data-driven and more focused on individual accountability.

For companies operating in concentrated markets, involved in strategic transactions or exposed to competition compliance risks, now is a good time to revisit internal processes and compliance frameworks.

If you would like to discuss how the proposed reform may affect your business or ongoing transactions in the Czech Republic, please contact Tomáš Matějovský or Lenka Krutáková.