Switzerland revises FINMA Anti-Money Laundering Ordinance: main changes
On 12 May 2026, the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) launched a consultation on the partially revised Anti-Money Laundering Ordinance (AMLO-FINMA), which was amended to prevent violations of coercive measures under the Embargo Act (EmbA). The revised AMLO-FINMA reinforces the requirement to understand client's structure and the requirements applicable to payable-through accounts and sub-accounts held for individuals. The consultation period runs until 9 June 2026.
These regulatory changes to Switzerland's anti-money laundering framework resulted from criticism by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), as detailed in the December 2016 report, which was part of the fourth evaluation cycle and the October 2023 follow-up assessment. During these assessments, the FATF identified various weaknesses in Switzerland's anti-money laundering framework. In this context, FINMA states that the purpose of this partial revision is to implement higher-ranking law (i.e. the Anti-Money Laundering Act - AMLA), address the FATF's criticisms in preparation for Switzerland's fifth evaluation round in 2027, incorporate current supervisory practice into the AMLO-FINMA where appropriate to ensure legal certainty, and strengthen the integrity of Switzerland's financial and economic centre.
Amending the purpose and new provision for sanctions
The revised Articles 1 and 8 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA), which will enter into force in late 2026, expressly require financial intermediaries to take organisational measures to prevent violations of the coercive measures under the EmbA. These amendments implement FATF Recommendations 1 and 2, which address the issue of financing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The Swiss Federal Council in its dispatch on Legal Entities Transparency Act stated that organisational measures include, in particular, the requirement to adopt internal guidelines and to establish a process—or a computerised system—for screening business relationships, principals and beneficiaries of transactions regarding sanctions. This risk analysis must be conducted periodically and may be included in the risk analysis related to money laundering and terrorist financing.
Echoing the amendment to the AMLA, the purpose of the revised AMLO-FINMA (art. 1 para. 1) explicitly includes measures to prevent financial intermediaries from violating the coercive measures under the EmbA.
To implement this change of purpose, a new article 30 AMLO-FINMA has been introduced, which contains measures to prevent violations of the EmbA by cross-referencing standard anti-money laundering provisions. These include travel rule requirement, the effective monitoring of business relationships and transactions, which ensure the timely detection of heightened risks. They also include the assessment of risks related to new products, business practices and technologies, and the implementation of mitigating measures. Cross-references also cover the tasks and activities set out in the provisions on the specialised anti-money laundering unit that financial intermediaries must have in place as well as the internal guidelines.
By linking the EmbA (i.e. sanctions) to the AMLA (i.e. anti-money laundering), the authorities could encourage certain financial intermediaries to align their analyses of both regimes and increase their reporting under the AMLA. In addition, pursuant to article 9 para. 1 AMLO-FINMA, failure to comply with these obligations may call into question the guarantee of impeccable conduct (garantie de l'activité irréprochable) required of financial intermediaries.
Understanding the ownership and control structure of clients
In its 2023 follow-up report, the FATF acknowledged that the AMLO-FINMA contained provisions requiring financial intermediaries to understand the motivations behind their clients' decision to establish domiciliary companies and use complex structures. The FATF, however, expressed regret that there was no explicit provision requiring financial intermediaries to understand the ownership and control structure of any type of business.
To date, as part of its supervisory practice, FINMA has required financial intermediaries to comply with this FATF request based on the existing regulatory framework, which is fundamentally principle-based. In response to the need for legal certainty and the FATF's request, this FINMA practice will be introduced in the AMLO-FINMA new article 9b.
Correspondent banking relationships
According to revised article 37 AMLO-FINMA, in line with FATF Recommendation 13.2, financial intermediaries may only make payments on behalf of the counterparty's clients if the counterparty will, upon request, provide the necessary client information relating to compliance with due diligence obligations.
Depending on the financial intermediary's risk assessment, this includes information on specific transactions or on the KYC profile of end clients, and other relevant and useful information that enables the correspondent bank to carry out further checks. The respondent bank should also have guidelines and processes in place to collect the relevant client information.
This revision formally enshrines FINMA's long-standing practice of verifying the completeness and transmission of information required for transfer orders via payable-through accounts in the AMLO-FINMA.
Sub-accounts for individual clients
Pursuant to the requirements set out in article 4 AMLA, the identity of the beneficial owner must always be verified. The addition of letter d to article 65 para. 2 AMLO-FINMA clarifies that a declaration from the contracting party (i.e. client) regarding the beneficial owner must always be requested, even in the case of sub-accounts for individual clients.
Travel rule for wire transfers to Liechtenstein
The current article 10 para. 3 AMLO-FINMA, which provides an exemption to the standard travel rule set out in article 10 para. 1 AMLO-FINMA, allows financial intermediaries to waive their obligation to request the full set of data for cross-border transfers to and from Liechtenstein. This provision, however, is incompatible with the FATF recommendations since transfer orders to and from Liechtenstein are considered cross-border payments.
Furthermore, since the introduction of the QR code on 1 July 2020, payments to Liechtenstein have technically not been processed as "domestic transfers". For this reason, as of that date, the full data set (i.e. a large data set) had to be provided for transfers to and from Liechtenstein, which had previously been considered domestic transfers. The provision of article 10 para. 3 AMLO-FINMA has therefore become useless and must be repealed.
Outlook
This partial revision will take effect on 1 January 2027 at the same time as the revised provisions of the Swiss Banks' Code of Conduct with regard to the exercise of due diligence (CDB) and the Swiss Insurance Association's Self-Regulatory Body Regulations concerning the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.
Financial intermediaries (e.g. banks, securities firms, portfolio managers and trustees), referred to in article 2, para. 2, letters a to d and dquater, should already take the necessary steps to ensure compliance with the revised framework following the end of the consultation period. Based on FINMA's existing practice and recent regulatory developments and trends, including those relating to the sanctions programme and related compliance matters, Swiss banks should be well prepared and not surprised. Other financial intermediaries, however, should pay attention to these developments given they may be less familiar with the applicable requirements.
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