Interest representation and lobbying in France: stocktaking and outlook for an evolving framework
Nearly ten years after the entry into force of the Sapin II Law of 9 December 2016, which created the register of interest representatives, and built on the framework established by the Law of 11 October 2013 on transparency in public life, the French system governing lobbying has undeniably secured a place in the legal landscape: in 2024, nearly 3,500 interest representatives were registered, reflecting stakeholders’ growing uptake of the system. Nevertheless, its structural limitations are now well identified, and a series of judicial, legislative and doctrinal developments is gradually reshaping its contours.
1. A broad definition with sometimes uncertain boundaries
Interest representation is defined by Article 18-2 of the Law on transparency in public life as the act of “influencing public decision-making, in particular the content of a law or a regulatory act, by entering into communication” with a public official. This definition focuses neither on the nature of the actor nor on the means of communication used, but rather on the purpose of the action: influencing a specific public decision. This substantive approach has the advantage of capturing the reality of lobbying practices in all their diversity, regardless of the status of those who carry them out.
For an activity to qualify as interest representation, five cumulative conditions must be met: the communication must be initiated by the representative; it must be directed at a public official exhaustively listed in Article 18-2; it must relate to an existing or forthcoming public decision; it must seek to influence that decision; and it must be carried out on behalf of a third party or in the interest of an organisation. The absence of any one of these conditions is sufficient to rule out that characterisation.
In practice, however, two of these criteria raise particular difficulties. The first is the requirement of initiative: it is not always easy to determine with certainty whether an exchange was initiated by the interest representative or by the public official, particularly in the context of ongoing and regular relationships where the line between solicitation and responding to an invitation tends to blur. This is, moreover, one of the criteria that the HATVP has recommended removing. The second is the objective of influence: in practice, it is not always straightforward to distinguish between communicating positions, raising awareness or sharing expertise, on the one hand, and seeking to influence a specific public decision, on the other. These grey areas help explain why civil society organisations have called for a revision of the legislative and regulatory framework to address the register’s well-identified shortcomings, particularly as regards thresholds, the initiative criterion and the level of detail required in disclosures.
Finally, since 1 July 2022, pursuant to Law No. 2022-217 of 21 February 2022 on differentiation, decentralisation, deconcentration and various measures to simplify local public action, known as the “3DS” Law, the scope of the public officials concerned has been significantly extended to include local executives such as regional and departmental presidents and mayors of municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants.
2. The 2024 Institut Montaigne decision of the Conseil d’Etat : towards an individualised assessment of the qualification
The year 2024 was marked by an important decision of the Conseil d’État which significantly altered the scope of the regime for certain categories of actors.
In its decision of 14 October 2024, the Conseil d’État held that “think tanks”, which the HATVP had decided to classify as interest representatives, could not be considered as such on that basis alone (CE, 14 October 2024, Institut Montaigne, No. 472123). The qualification now requires the HATVP to assess three cumulative criteria relating to funding conditions, governance arrangements and the conditions under which their work is carried out.
This decision, delivered at the initiative of Institut Montaigne, which challenged both its registration in the register and the HATVP’s “guidelines” insofar as they treated think tanks as interest representatives, goes beyond the sole case of think tanks. It confirms that the qualification of interest representative requires a concrete and individualised assessment of the actual nature of the activities carried out, and not a purely formal approach based on the entity’s apparent activity. The High Authority has taken note of this decision by adapting its doctrine with regard to the entities concerned.
3. A structured disclosure procedure with significant practical implications
Where the relevant criteria are met, and in particular where one of an entity’s members, officers or employees carries out interest representation activities as a principal activity — that is, by devoting more than half of their time to such activities over a six-month period — or on a regular basis, by communicating at least ten times with public officials over a twelve months period, the entity must register within two months via the AGORA online platform.
The resulting disclosure obligations, set out in Decree No. 2017-867 of 9 May 2017 relating to the digital register of interest representatives, are structured and recurring: initial registration, monthly updates in the event of changes, annual declaration in the form of activity reports detailing the objectives pursued, the decisions targeted, the public officials contacted and the resources allocated (disclosed in ranges), and retention of supporting documents for five years. These obligations are not accompanied by any specific rights in return: the framework grants no tax advantage and confers no formalised privileged access to public officials.
The annual reporting cycles also calls for some observations. As it stands, a lobbying activity carried out in January 2026 will only appear in the register in March 2027, which mechanically reduces the usefulness of the register as a real-time information tool on the influence exerted on public decision-making. It is precisely to address this time lag that the HATVP proposes moving to semi-annual activity reporting, while maintaining annual reporting for the entity’s structural data.
More broadly, the burden represented by the disclosure exercise as a whole should not be underestimated. The annual declaration requires a comprehensive identification and classification of all activities carried out during the year, all of which must be documented and retained for five years for audit purposes. This represents a significant burden for all reporting entities, especially as the quality of declarations is itself monitored by the HATVP: in 2024, 74.3% of declared items met the minimum clarity requirements defined by the Authority, a figure that reflects a certain difficulty in accurately describing the nature and purpose of the activities carried out.
4. A sanctions regime called to evolve
From an enforcement perspective, the framework has one notable feature: since the register came into force in 2017, no criminal conviction has been handed down for failure to comply with disclosure obligations. The HATVP itself acknowledges that the penalty of one year’s imprisonment and a fine of €15,000 provided for in Article 18-9 of the Law “is manifestly inappropriate” in light of the nature of the breaches observed. For the 2024 reporting year, 330 representatives had not submitted any declaration despite several reminders, a situation that has further fuelled reflection on reform of the sanctions framework.
For several years, the HATVP has proposed that Parliament grant it the power to impose administrative sanctions, subject to due process and implemented through a graduated procedure. Such an evolution would make it possible to have a proportionate regulatory tool complementary to the criminal route, which would remain reserved for particularly serious breaches. To date, however, no such reform has been enacted.
It should also be noted that the supervision of ethical obligations, set out in Article 18-5 of the Law, follows a different logic from that governing disclosure obligations: while the latter aim to ensure transparency and traceability of lobbying activities through reporting requirements, the former seek to regulate, substantively, the conduct of interest representatives in their relations with public officials.
In the exercise of its supervisory powers under Article 18-7 of the Law on transparency in public life, the HATVP must, before issuing any formal notice, give the interest representative concerned an opportunity to submit observations, in accordance with the principle of adversarial proceedings by which it is bound. Any ensuing formal notice may be made public, thereby creating reputational consequences which, in some circumstances, may prove more significant than the criminal sanction itself. It is only in the event of a repeat breach — that is, a breach of the same obligation within three years following the formal notice — that the criminal sanction becomes fully applicable.
The Conseil d’État has clarified the litigation regime applicable to such measures : a formal notice constitutes an adverse administrative decision and may therefore be challenged, whereas a notification of breaches is merely preparatory, as are the letters preceding it, by which the High Authority invites a person, even before the initiation of proceedings, to comply with the provisions of the law (14 October 2024, Institut Montaigne decision cited above).
5. Towards more transparent lobbying: possible avenues for reform
Beyond the issue of sanctions, the HATVP has put forward several proposals for structural reform: removal of the initiative criterion, clarification of the scope of public decisions concerned, and a shift to semi-annual reporting. Transparency International France, during its hearing in February 2026 as part of the review of twelve years of the HATVP, supplemented these proposals by suggesting in particular a clearer distinction between NGOs and professional and economic associations in lobbying categories, the introduction of a data point relating to whether the interest represented is for-profit or non-profit, an obligation for consulting firms to break down their expenditure declarations by client, and the merging of the foreign influence register with that of interest representatives in order to facilitate management and avoid any drift away from the initial objective of democratic transparency.
In this context, Law No. 2024-850 of 25 July 2024 on preventing foreign interference in France has expanded the HATVP’s powers by creating a register dedicated to foreign influence, operational from 1 July 2025. While this new framework addresses issues distinct from those of traditional interest representation, it forms part of the same broader trend: an increasing requirement for transparency in the relationships between private actors and public life, the contours of which continue to be shaped by French law.
6. A comparative perspective: regulation of interest representation at European level
The French framework forms part of a broader movement to regulate interest representation at European level. Since 2011, the European Union has maintained a transparency register common to the European Parliament and the European Commission. That framework was substantially strengthened by the interinstitutional agreement of 20 May 2021, which entered into force on 1 July 2021 and brought in the Council of the European Union. This register, jointly managed by the three institutions, lists all organisations and individuals carrying out activities aimed at influencing the development or implementation of EU policies.
Registration in the European transparency register is based on a principle of conditionality: while formally voluntary, it is in practice a prerequisite for carrying out certain institutional interactions. Thus, only registered interest representatives may request meetings with members of the European Commission, their cabinets or Directors-General, participate as speakers in public hearings of the European Parliament, or obtain long-term access badges to Parliament buildings. This incentive-based mechanism gives the register a practical significance that goes beyond that of a simple disclosure tool.
The disclosure obligations present some similarities with the French framework. Entities must provide information relating to their identity, their lobbying activities, the legislative or policy files concerned, as well as an estimate of the financial resources devoted to these activities. A code of conduct, annexed to the interinstitutional agreement, sets out the applicable ethical rules. The register’s secretariat has investigative powers and may, in the event of a breach, impose measures ranging from a warning to removal from the register, which entails the loss of all advantages linked to registration. Unlike the French framework, the European approach thus favours a regulatory model based on incentives and conditional access to institutions rather than criminal sanctions, which provides a useful point of comparison in the context of the reforms under consideration in France.
French law on interest representation has entered a phase of maturity: although it remains relatively little known, the time is no longer for building the framework, but for refining it. Between clarifying the criteria for qualification, improving the quality of available information and evolving the sanctions regime, the expected reforms will need to reconcile two essential requirements: ensuring transparency in the influence exerted on public decision-making, without excessively hindering the participation of private actors and civil society in public debate.
