Fifty years of State support in France for arms exports: from industrial cooperation to G-to-G contracts and European mobilisation

Arms exports occupy a distinctive place in France’s industrial policy. They contribute to the viability of the defence technological and industrial base (DTIB); they help spread the development and production costs of military equipment that contributes to the country’s autonomy; and they serve as an instrument for building closer ties with partner States. Unlike in most other industrial sectors, the State does not act solely as a regulator: it is also a customer, a setter of requirements, an industrial partner and, increasingly, a direct participant in contractual transactions. 

Its role as regulator remains paramount 1 . Exports of military equipment are prohibited unless authorised, under a regime codified in Articles L. 2335-2 et seq. of the Defence Code 2 , in compliance with France’s international commitments 3 . 

It is within this framework that a public policy of export support has developed against a backdrop of strong growth in global military expenditure. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), this expenditure reached USD 2,887 billion in 2025, an increase of 2.9% in real terms year on year and 41% over ten years 4 . The increase is spectacular in Europe 5 , particularly in countries that had ground to make up… or that lie furthest to the east. Expenditure reached USD 864 billion in 2025, an increase of 14% in one year and double the 2016 level. 

France is benefiting from this trend: export orders reached EUR 21.2 billion in 2025 6 . As the world’s second-largest exporter of major arms after the United States, France accounted for 9.8% of global exports over the 2021–2025 period, an increase of 21% compared with 2016–2020. The arms sector makes a positive contribution to France’s trade balance, with a surplus of EUR 4.7 billion in 2024, rising to EUR 6.7 billion in 2025. 

Europe now accounts for 21% of French exports of major arms, compared with a much smaller share previously. The European market is a growing outlet for French manufacturers, although almost 80% of their exports still go to other regions of the world. 

Moreover, Europe’s dependence on the United States clearly remains very strong: according to SIPRI, the United States accounted for 58% of imports of major arms by European NATO members over the 2021–2025 period, a stable share… but with volumes doubling. The challenge for France is therefore not only to expand exports and gain market share, but also to encourage greater European autonomy. 

For more than fifty years, public authorities have developed instruments to support French exports, particularly in Europe. The initial approach, based on cooperation between States to share costs, has been supplemented by industrial integration mechanisms, legal arrangements facilitating exports and, more recently, government-to-government procurement models. More recent European support measures complete the picture. 

Four main stages can be identified. 

1. Industrial cooperation as the first instrument of export support 

As early as the 1960s and 1970s, France made international cooperation on armaments a major strand of its industrial policy, with a view to sharing the development and production costs of military equipment while broadening the markets accessible to French manufacturers. 

Franco-German cooperation played a pioneering role 7 . Major joint programmes in military air transport, training aircraft and missiles 8  helped establish shared industrial sectors and develop equipment that could be marketed to other States. Several of these products achieved significant export success well beyond the European market alone. 

This policy was accompanied by the establishment of a specialised administrative structure. Created in 1961, the Délégation ministérielle pour l’armement became the Délégation générale pour l’armement in 1977, then the Direction générale de l’armement (DGA) in 2009 9 . This administration, with approximately 10,000 staff, has brought together high-level expertise in programme management, the negotiation of international cooperation arrangements, technical matters, support for manufacturers, and participation in export development and control 10 . As Alexandre Pointier writes in a recent book 11 , the DGA ‘embodies the decision to retain engineering, technical expertise and project ownership capabilities within the State. It shows that, when the State chooses to do so, it can retain the know-how needed to engage with manufacturers, specify complex requirements and preserve institutional knowledge of programmes over time’. 

The 1990s and 2000s marked a new stage centred on multinational programmes and growing integration, as illustrated by Franco-Italian cooperation in the naval sector 12 . Its commercial benefits in Europe nevertheless remained limited. Cooperation does not guarantee success in external markets. 

The record is more favourable in missiles and helicopters. The creation of MBDA in 2001, bringing together French, British and Italian activities, helped establish a European industrial player capable of offering a broad range of weapons systems. Its commercial successes in Europe 13  demonstrate the effectiveness of such integration. In helicopters, cooperative programmes 14  and subsequent European sales of Airbus Helicopters aircraft illustrate the advantages of an integrated industrial base, as well as some of the governance difficulties associated with multilateral projects. 

Cooperation with the British was deepened by the 2010 Lancaster House agreements 15 , with a view to pooling development costs and preserving strategic capabilities. In the missile sector, the One Complex Weapons initiative, implemented around MBDA, encouraged specialisation and interdependence between French and British industrial capabilities. This cooperation helped consolidate a competitive industrial base and facilitate exports, without establishing a common mechanism for authorising sales to third countries. 

The French experience thus reveals an essential distinction: cooperation in development makes it possible to share costs and consolidate industrial capabilities, but its effect on exports remains indirect and uncertain. 

2. The gradual development of an institutional and legal framework conducive to exports 

From the 1990s onwards, France sought to move beyond ad hoc cooperation between States by institutionalising pooling mechanisms and reducing legal and administrative barriers to the arms trade. 

The creation of the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR) in 1996, followed by the entry into force of its founding convention in 2001, represented an important step forward 16 . Initially bringing together France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom 17 , OCCAR manages joint programmes 18 . It has also helped relax the traditional principle of industrial ‘juste retour’, which required a close correspondence between each State’s financial contribution and the industrial benefits accruing to its companies, in favour of an overall balance assessed across several programmes. 

The Farnborough Framework Agreement of 27 July 2000, concluded between six European States, including France 19 , pursued a complementary objective: facilitating transnational industrial restructuring by addressing, in particular, security of supply, transfers, export procedures and research, not to create a direct sales instrument, but rather to establish an environment more conducive to European industrial integration. 

This approach was carried forward into European Union law, despite the traumatic memory of the EDC (European Defence Community), the EU’s limited powers and the sovereignty safeguard in Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 20 . Directive 2009/43/EC of 6 May 2009 thus simplified the terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Union 21 . Transposed in particular by Law No. 2011-702 of 22 June 2011, it led to a distinction in the Defence Code between exports to third countries and intra-Community transfers. 

Article L. 2335-2 of the Defence Code therefore establishes the principle that exports of military equipment to non-EU States are prohibited without prior authorisation, while Article L. 2335-3 governs the issuing of export licences. Transfers to other Member States are governed by Articles L. 2335-8 to L. 2335-18, which establish a system of general, global or individual licences. The purpose of this framework is to reduce the administrative constraints on transnational production chains without removing Member States’ oversight 22 . 

Lastly, Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008, regularly updated to reflect changes in Europe’s strategic environment, remains the common benchmark for controls on exports of military equipment 23 . 

While national differences, particularly between France and Germany, have at times posed a major obstacle to cooperation, it seeks to bring national policies closer together and enhance transparency, while preserving States’ power to authorise or refuse exports. 

Indeed, the Treaty of Aachen of 22 January 2019 24  and the Franco-German agreement on defence export controls, signed on 23 October 2019, sought, with clear determination, to address these difficulties, particularly for integrated products covered by the so-called ‘de minimis’ principle. This provides for a simplified procedure where the proportion of components originating from the other partner remains below a threshold agreed between the States. These principles were subsequently incorporated into a multilateral agreement signed on 17 September 2021, including Spain. 

France has thus gradually sought to provide legal certainty for the commercial outlets of industrial cooperation. This approach nevertheless continues to face differences between States over foreign policy, industrial sovereignty and arms control. 

3. The emergence of a new model: government-to-government procurement 

Since the late 2010s, a more profound shift has been taking shape, along the lines of the United States’ Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 25 . Among the various government-to-government (G2G) cooperation mechanisms 26 , France has developed a specific arrangement: procurement in the name and on behalf of a partner State (“achat au nom et pour le compte de”, or ANPC), which allows that State to mandate the DGA to acquire military equipment on its behalf within an intergovernmental framework. 

The Franco-Belgian CaMo (Motorised Capability) programme, launched through an intergovernmental agreement of 7 November 2018 27 , is an illustrative milestone. Initially covering Belgium’s acquisition of several hundred armoured vehicles, this partnership goes far beyond equipment sales and encompasses doctrine, operations, logistics and training, with the aim of developing deep interoperability between French and Belgian land forces. Legally, it rests in particular on France’s ability to conduct contracting procedures ‘in the name and on behalf’ of Belgium. The commercial relationship between manufacturers and the foreign purchaser is thus embedded in a lasting inter-State partnership supported by the DGA’s expertise. This ANPC approach was expanded from 2024 onwards. 

This mechanism must be coordinated with the provisions of the Public Procurement Code governing defence or security contracts 28 . Article L. 1113-1 defines this category of contracts, which includes, in particular, the supply of military equipment and services directly related to its life cycle. Their award is governed primarily by Book III of Part Two of the Code, namely Articles L. 2300-1 et seq. Article L. 2322-1 allows these contracts to be awarded without prior publication or competition in certain cases defined by regulation. Article L. 2515-1 also lays down specific rules for certain acquisitions relating, in particular, to the State’s essential security interests within the meaning of Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and for certain contracts awarded under procedures laid down in international agreements. 

It is nevertheless important to distinguish the inter-State mandate allowing France to act for a foreign partner from the award rules applicable to each contract, since ANPC does not, in itself, constitute an exemption from public procurement rules. The applicable procedure therefore depends on the characteristics of the transaction and the legislation governing it. Depending on its destination, the equipment acquired also remains subject to the export or transfer authorisation regime laid down in the Defence Code. 

The mechanism offers several advantages. For the purchasing State, it facilitates access to proven equipment and reduces the difficulties involved in conducting complex procurement procedures. For France, it makes it possible to aggregate orders, increase economies of scale and directly support domestic manufacturers, as new agreements clearly illustrate 29 . 

ANPC thus marks a change in the nature of State intervention. The French State no longer merely supports its manufacturers’ commercial efforts: it places its own procurement capabilities at the service of foreign partners. This development strengthens the DGA’s central role. It also reflects the intention to offer European partners not only equipment, but a genuine capability partnership, potentially including training, maintenance, support and interoperability. 

4. The growing contribution of European legal and financial instruments 

These developments now form part of a European environment profoundly transformed by the war in Ukraine and the acceleration of Member States’ rearmament. Since 2021, the European Union has gradually developed instruments capable of indirectly supporting French manufacturers’ exports. 

The European Defence Fund (EDF), established by Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of 29 April 2021, finances collaborative research and development projects. Regulation (EU) 2023/2418 of 18 October 2023, concerning the EDIRPA instrument, encourages joint procurement of defence equipment, while Regulation (EU) 2023/1525 of 20 July 2023, establishing ASAP, seeks to strengthen European ammunition and missile production capacities. More recently, the SAFE mechanism 30 , established by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 of 27 May 2025, provided for European loans to facilitate certain defence investments and acquisitions. The European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) 31  complements this architecture, as does the revision of defence procurement rules 32  due to enter into force in autumn 2026. 

These instruments and their budget allocations 33  can help broaden the markets accessible to French manufacturers and encourage the aggregation of European orders. The coordinated procurement of very-short-range ground-based air defence systems 34 , combining intergovernmental cooperation, contractual involvement by the DGA and European support under EDIRPA, illustrates the scope for complementarity between national and European instruments. As investment continues, it is very important for DTIB companies to understand how these new tools work. 

To take matters further, the Cour des comptes made several proposals in 2023 35 , notably to provide greater support to small and medium-sized enterprises within the DTIB, involve adjacent dual-use (civilian and military) sectors more closely and simplify export controls. One major challenge will be to strengthen consistency between the various export support instruments and better coordinate national and European initiatives, so that the development of armaments cooperation contributes both to the competitiveness of French companies and to Europe’s strategic autonomy.