A fixed future for renewables support: DESNZ consults on replacing tradable ROCs with fixed price certificates
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On 3 November 2026, the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (“DESNZ”) opened a consultation on replacing tradable Renewables Obligation Certificates (“ROCs”) with a centrally administered Fixed Price Certificate (“FPC”) system, taking effect no sooner than the 2028/29 scheme year.
The proposals move the concept of an FPC scheme from evidence-gathering to a concrete model. Certificate trading would end: generators would receive a single, administratively set price for the rest of the scheme’s life, and suppliers would pay a levy to a central administrator instead of buying ROCs. That promises greater revenue certainty but reshapes the commercial arrangements, cashflows and risk allocation built up over two decades. This legal update considers the background, the proposals and their implications for generators, suppliers, investors and lenders.
Background
The Renewables Obligation (“RO”) scheme has been the UK’s main support mechanism for large-scale renewable electricity since the early 2000s, operating as three schemes: the RO in England and Wales, the Renewables Obligation Scotland and the Northern Ireland Renewables Obligation. Whilst the scheme closed to new applicants in 2017, the RO remains the UK’s largest renewable electricity support scheme, with some accredited generators continuing to receive support until the scheme closes in 2037.
Under the existing scheme, accredited generators receive ROCs from Ofgem in proportion to the electricity they generate and sell them, typically under power purchase agreements (“PPAs”), to suppliers, traders or intermediaries. ROC values depend on PPA terms and on the scheme’s compliance framework: the buy-out price (£69.34 for 2026/27, now CPI-indexed), the recycling of buy-out funds to compliant suppliers, and a 10% “headroom” that keeps demand for certificates ahead of supply. Where supplier defaults exceed a statutory threshold, compliant suppliers must make up the shortfall through mutualisation.
From traded ROCs to FPCs
A move to FPCs from 2027 was first proposed in 2011 to address the certificate-price volatility expected as early stations reached the end of their support and left the RO scheme. Section 32N of the Electricity Act 1989 provides the statutory basis for such a transition, enabling the existing RO scheme to be replaced by an FPC system.
A 2021 consultation on supplier default was followed by a 2023 Call for Evidence examining whether, when and how to introduce FPCs and testing two central-counterparty models. Many respondents considered an immediate transition premature because the traded market was, at the time, functioning and the principal volatility risk had receded.
The 2026 consultation now sets out the government’s preferred approach, known as ‘Model 1’: generators would continue to receive certificates based on their renewable generation, but those certificates would no longer be tradable. The central counterparty would instead purchase them at a fixed price. Suppliers would cease buying ROCs from generators and traders and would instead fund the scheme through a levy.
DESNZ sees this as a way of addressing the prospect of declining liquidity and increasing ROC price volatility ahead of scheme closure. DESNZ’s analysis now suggests that material volatility is unlikely to emerge until the early to mid-2030s, but it considers that earlier implementation may nevertheless be justified by potential savings for consumers and the opportunity to reduce supplier default risk.
The reform is therefore principally about changing how existing support is priced, funded and paid, rather than reopening or redesigning the underlying support scheme. Existing eligibility, accreditation periods and banding arrangements are not proposed to change.
A certificate purchase order would replace the three schemes with a single UK-wide scheme run by one delivery body. Following the April 2026 Ofgem Review, the government is considering whether that body should be Ofgem or another organisation.
The below diagram gives an overview of how the existing RO scheme and the proposed FPC system differ.
How would an FPC be priced?
Three design elements are likely to attract particular attention: pricing, the supplier levy and administrator solvency.
Pricing: The government proposes using the ROC buy-out price in the final RO scheme year as the baseline for the first FPC price, subsequently indexed to CPI. One of the most commercially significant questions is what happens to the value currently created by the RO’s 10% headroom mechanism. Rather than carrying headroom into the new scheme, the government proposes adding an uplift directly to the FPC price. Because that uplift would apply uniformly, its effect on individual generators could differ materially depending on their existing PPA terms.
The government’smodelling suggests that an uplift of around 4% would broadly maintain aggregate generator revenues; a 10% uplift would add roughly £1.9bn to scheme costs to 2036/37; whilst a 2% uplift would save around £0.9bn but reduce support.
Supplier levy: Suppliers would no longer purchase certificates. Instead, the government proposes a supplier levy calculated by reference to electricity supplied, with two possible calculation models currently under consideration:
- a £/MWh levy rate applied to forecast supply, or
- an allocation based on historic market share.
The first relies more heavily on forecasts, while the second guarantees recovery but may misallocate costs where market shares shift.
The consultation’s preferred settlement model is quarterly payment in advance, followed by quarterly reconciliation against actual costs and supply data. Suppliers could also be required to provide advance credit cover, potentially through cash, standby letters of credit, first demand guarantees or trust arrangements. A separately funded reserve is proposed to manage forecasting and short-term liquidity risk, with mutualisation retained as a last-resort protection against supplier default.
Administrator solvency: As funds would no longer flow directly between suppliers and generators, the administrator would be protected by supplier credit cover, a reserve funded through the proposed levy and, as a last resort, mutualisation of supplier defaults, as shown in the below diagram.
What does this mean for those affected?
For generators, the principal benefit would be greater certainty over certificate revenues and the removal of ROC trading and associated trading-counterparty exposure. That predictability should support revenue forecasting and financing, although payment would remain subject to a “pay when paid” principle, mirroring the CfD scheme. Generators would receive certificates monthly in arrears, with an annual option for microgenerators if preferred. The administrator would have a statutory duty to pay within 20 working days of a certificate being presented for purchase, subject to that principle.
Unissued or untraded ROCs at the switch would be honoured at their buy-out price, funded through the levy and subject to a 25-month presentation deadline.
A single uplift will create winners and losers. On the government’s own archetypes, a generator capturing close to 100% of ROC and recycle value would lose revenue even at a 10% uplift, while one receiving a lower share could break even or gain at a much lower level.
However, the change will need to be considered carefully against existing financing and contractual arrangements. Many PPAs contain detailed mechanisms governing ROC ownership, pricing, recycle payments, trading discounts and payment timing. Removing the traded ROC and buy-out/recycle structure could therefore require existing arrangements to be revisited well before implementation. The government itself identifies PPAs, revenue and financing, cashflow and settlement processes as areas potentially materially affected by the reform.
Suppliers face the greatest change to cashflow. Advance levy payments, upfront credit cover and a reserve charge would tie up working capital, particularly for smaller suppliers, with potential knock-on effects for tariffs. Although mutualisation would be a last resort, it would leave compliant suppliers exposed to other suppliers' defaults; uncertainty over those costs may increase risk premia. Mutualisation would also be new in Northern Ireland. Forecasting risk would remain because the levy is based on estimates of generation and supply.
The anticipated transition to FPCs would involve a period of overlap, with the RO and FPC systems running alongside each other for much of 2028 as the final RO compliance year closes:
Next steps
Key decisions remain open and subject to further consultation, including the uplift level, the design of the levy and solvency measures, and the identity of the administrator. The table below gives an ‘at a glance’ overview of where each element of the FPC proposals currently stands under the consultation.
With key aspects of the proposals still open, market participants should assess the potential impact on their businesses and consider the following steps ahead of implementation.
- Generators: Model the proposed baseline price and a range of uplifts against current revenues for each asset. Use the results to support consultation responses where assets would be disadvantaged.
- Portfolio owners: Assess how a uniform price would redistribute value across wind, solar and other RO-accredited assets, rather than assuming a neutral outcome across technologies.
- All parties: Review PPAs for provisions built around tradable ROCs, recycled buy-out value and supplier-generator settlement. Develop negotiating positions ahead of any renegotiation.
- Suppliers: Assess the cashflow impact of advance settlement, credit cover and the reserve charge. Use the consultation to express views on the levy calculation method, credit cover mechanisms and mutualisation trigger.
- Lenders and investors: Reflect the proposed timetable, uncertainty over the administrator and the uplift level in financial models, valuations and transaction structuring.
Responses are due by 12 January 2027, and the government’s planned stakeholder events offer a further opportunity to influence the final design.
Get in touch
The move to FPCs is the most significant change to the RO since its inception, and its impact will vary between assets and businesses. If you would like to discuss how the proposals affect your revenues, PPAs, levy and credit cover arrangements, financing or valuations, or would like support with a consultation response, please contact the authors or your usual CMS contact.