Criminal contempt claim grounded: acting contrary to the spirit of an injunction insufficient to attract liability

On 14 November 2025, judgment was handed down in the appeal of FW Aviation (Holdings) 1 Limited v VietJet Aviation Joint Stock Company [2025] EWCA Civ 1458.

This case provides an interesting example of the court’s approach to the law of contempt and its interaction with injunctions. The court held that a party subject to an injunction cannot be in contempt where it has arguably acted contrary to the spirit of the injunction, but not the letter.  

Background

FW Aviation (Holdings) 1 Limited (“FWA”) is part of FitzWalter Capital, an investment fund. VietJet Aviation Joint Stock Company is a Vietnamese airline.

The wider dispute concerns four aircraft leased by VietJet. After VietJet failed to make payments the FitzWalter group bought out the interests of the lenders and lessors with a view to acquiring the aircraft and pursuing claims against VietJet under the leases.

FWA commenced proceedings for possession of the aircraft and the parties agreed a consent order providing for FWA’s right to possession, custody and control of the aircraft, and for the de-registration and export of the aircraft. FWA then de-registered the aircraft from the Vietnamese register and re-registered them in Guernsey, with a view to exporting them from Vietnam so it could put them back on the international aircraft leasing market.

Subsequently, some VietJet shareholders brought proceedings in Vietnam against the Civil Aviation Authority of Vietnam (“CAAV”) and obtained an injunction suspending the de-registration of the aircraft from the Vietnamese register and declaring that VietJet could have the aircraft re-registered so it could operate them.

As a consequence of this FWA obtained an interim injunction prohibiting VietJet from: “(i) taking steps to reregister the Aircraft with the CAAV; and (ii) taking possession of or operating the Aircraft either directly or indirectly or otherwise interfering with the Claimant’s right to possession, custody and/or control of the Aircraft”. FWA also issued a contempt application for breaches of the consent order.

VietJet then disclosed correspondence with the CAAV and others which showed it challenging the ability of Vietnamese authorities to issue an Export Certificate of Airworthiness where the aircraft had been re-registered in Guernsey (the “Letters”).

The contempt application

In August 2024, FWA applied for permission to amend the contempt application by adding a new allegation that in sending the Letters VietJet: “intentionally interfer[ed] with the administration of justice by attempting to circumvent the prohibition on VietJet from interfering with the Claimant’s right to possession, custody and/or control of the Aircraft under paragraph 1 of the Prohibitory Injunction.” FWA’s position was not that VietJet had breached the injunction, but that the Letters were contrary to its spirit and purpose and amounted to a criminal contempt.

Permission to make this amendment was granted, with the judge ruling that: “VietJet and the other two proposed Defendants sought to undermine or interfere with the administration of justice, including the essence of what was ordered through the Prohibitory Injunction, if not the literal substance of that order.”

Issue

The issue in this appeal concerned whether a respondent to an injunction who has not actually done anything prohibited by that injunction can be guilty of a criminal contempt for “acting contrary to the spirit and purpose of the injunction.”

Both parties agreed that the previous judge had not addressed the argument put by VietJet’s counsel that, unless it had actually breached the injunction, the Letters could not constitute a contempt.

FWA’s counsel submitted that:

1. The purpose of the law of contempt is to ensure no usurping of the court’s functions and to prevent any interference with due administration of justice.
2. The purpose of the injunction here was to protect FWA’s entitlement to possession, custody and control of the aircraft and prevent VietJet’s interference with that entitlement.
3. There was a real prospect FWA would be able to prove at trial that the Letters amounted to an interference with the injunction’s purpose and that the actus reus and mens rea of a criminal contempt could be established.
4. If FWA were able to prove these matters, all elements of a criminal contempt could be established, even without a breach of the injunction.

Ruling

The Court of Appeal considered whether there had been a criminal contempt, noting that, from the perspective of a hypothetical third party, they can only be liable for criminal contempt for interfering with the administration of justice. However, there was no basis for a third party to be in criminal contempt by doing an act which, although contrary to the spirit of an injunction, does not involve doing anything prohibited by it. Accordingly, as a third party could not be so liable, it followed that an injunction respondent could not be either, since this would extend the injunction beyond its terms.

VietJet’s appeal was therefore allowed, and the judge’s order for FWA to be permitted to amend its grounds of contempt was set aside.

Comment

Whie this case is factually novel, it is perhaps not surprising given that existing case law emphasises the importance of certainty - those on notice of an injunction must be able to ascertain exactly what conduct is so prohibited by that injunction. As recognised by the Court of Appeal, the rationale for this is obvious, given the serious consequences, including committal to prison, if contempt is established. For those applying for an injunction, the court advised ensuring that conduct which an injunction intends to prohibit is properly defined in the court’s order.

The judgment is available in full here.