Sometimes Silence is Best: The Counterproductive Consequences of Weak Defamation or Harrassment Claims

On 22 August 2025, the High Court handed down its judgment in the highly publicised defamation proceedings brought by Noel Clarke against the Guardian (Clarke v Guardian [2025] EWHC 2193 (KB)). The Court ruled in favour of the Guardian in respect of both its truth defence (codified in section 2 of the Defamation Act 2013) and its public interest defence (section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013). The judgment could be seen as a cautionary tale to claimants – by bringing a defamation claim in spite of extensive evidence supporting the allegations made, an action that was intended to restore the claimant’s reputation, may well result in considerably more reputational damage. The same can be true of weak harassment claims, a recent example being Sledziewski & Anor v Persons Unknown & Anor [2024] EWHC 1955 (KB). In this article we look at both cases and why the claimants in each case were unsuccessful in achieving their intended outcomes.

Clarke v Guardian

Over the course of April and May 2021 (and again in March 2022), the Guardian published eight articles pertaining to sexual harassment and bullying allegations made against Noel Clarke. Clarke issued a protective claim on the final day of the applicable limitation period, 29 April 2022. The trial took place over six weeks in March and April 2025.

In respect of the truth defence, the Court was satisfied on the basis of the evidence provided that the meaning of the Guardian’s first article (the only article for which the serious harm threshold was met pursuant to section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013) — that there were strong grounds to believe Clarke was a serial abuser of women, engaging in a pattern of sexual harassment, bullying, unwanted sexual contact, inappropriate behaviour, professional misconduct, and non-consensual sharing or filming of explicit material— was substantially true.

The Guardian was able to present oral evidence from 26 witnesses, and written evidence from three others, in support of its truth defence. In order to counter the Guardian’s evidence, Clarke had to plead that almost all 29 of the Guardian’s witnesses were lying, or any least lying in part, as part of a conspiracy – a theory the Court found to be “inherently implausible”.

By way of contrast, many of Clarke’s witnesses could provide evidence only as to his character, as opposed to the alleged conduct (though there were some exceptions). A further evidential challenge for Clarke’s case was that at short notice five of his witnesses were stated to be unable to attend court to provide their evidence orally. Hearsay notices for those witnesses’ statements were served late. Mrs Justice Steyn commented on the fact that the trial dates were known considerably in advance of the dates of the witness statements in question and made various criticisms of the reasons given for the absence of four of the five absent witnesses. Where their evidence was not struck out for being inadmissible or irrelevant, by reference to the section 4 of the Civil Evidence Act 1995, she largely gave either little or no weight to the evidence of those witnesses.

Sledziewski & Anor v Persons Unknown & Anor

In Sledziewski, the Claimants were a company manufacturing bespoke plaster coving products, and the same company’s managing director. The First Defendant was an unidentified individual operating a Youtube Channel called “Chapona Bicyclette”, who, on 10 November 2023, had filmed and uploaded a video of a van belonging to the company driving very close to him while he was cycling. He captioned the video, “Cornices Centre? I don't think I'll be bothering with any fancy plaster work from yourselves. Wouldn't want a road death on my conscience if one happened whilst you were out driving. Which seems entirely plausible”.  After exchanging some correspondence with Chapona Bicyclette, and another person operating a Youtube Channel called “Black Belt Barrister” (who had reposted excerpts of the video with legal commentary), the Claimants brought proceedings against both individuals, arguing that the Defendants' conduct, including their subsequent social media posts and emails, amounted to harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.

The Court observed that the hallmark of harassment is conduct that is “unacceptable and oppressive, not merely unattractive or unreasonable,” and of a gravity that could sustain criminal liability.  The court also noted that, where the alleged harassment involves publication (such as social media posts), the Defendants’ rights to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights are engaged.

Ultimately the Court concluded that, although some of the First Defendant’s actions were unreasonable (such as suggesting the First Claimant was the van driver without basis and mentioning a £10,000 compensation demand), the overall conduct did not cross the threshold of being “unacceptable and oppressive,” and therefore did not constitute harassment. The Defendants’ posts could be considered a form of citizen journalism, and while robust press criticism can be distressing, there is a high bar for journalistic material to be deemed harassment. Additionally, the posts did not contain any incitement or encouragement to others to harass the Claimants.

Comment

The judgments in both Clarke and Sledziewski serve as reminders of the challenges claimants encounter when pursuing claims to protect their reputations that lack robust evidential foundations.  In defamation proceedings, as demonstrated in Clarke, the burden on the claimant to disprove well-supported truth and public interest defences is substantial. Adducing evidence from reliable witnesses who will attend court to give evidence orally is a significant part of preparing for such a trial. The risk is not merely the failure of the claim, but the potential for further reputational harm as the underlying allegations are scrutinised and, in some cases, judicially affirmed. 

Similarly, harassment claims face a high legal threshold, especially where the conduct in question involves publication or commentary on matters of public interest.  The courts have made clear that only conduct which is truly “unacceptable and oppressive” will suffice, and that freedom of expression remains a powerful counterweight.  Weak claims, particularly those that conflate robust criticism or citizen journalism with harassment, are unlikely to succeed and may inadvertently draw greater attention to the very issues the claimant seeks to suppress.