Hungarian government proposes constitutional amendments: key changes at a glance

The Hungarian government has tabled an amendment to the Hungarian constitution that would introduce an extensive package of reforms affecting the operation of numerous core state institutions. The proposal forms part of wider legal reform to restore the conditions for constitutional democracy and the rule of law, while laying the groundwork for the preparation of an entirely new constitution through broad social and professional consultation.

The following article summarises the major changes being proposed.

Transitional reform – new constitution on the horizon

The amendment is expressly transitional character. The government has presented the proposal as an interim measure to address the most pressing institutional issues ahead of a broader constitution-drafting process, which is expected to commence in autumn 2026.

It remains to be seen which proposed change will be temporary and which will become permanent features of Hungary’s constitutional order since more comprehensive constitutional reform is expected to follow in the near future.

Removal of the President of the Republic

The amendment would terminate the mandate of the incumbent President of the Republic, Tamás Sulyok, with immediate effect. A new president would be elected by Parliament for the transitional period until the entry into force of a new constitution, subject to a maximum term of five years.

Changes concerning the Constitutional Court

The amendment introduces significant structural changes to the Constitutional Court:

• Mandatory retirement age and termination of mandates: A mandatory retirement age of 70 years would be reintroduced, reinstating a threshold that was in force until 2013. Under the transitional provisions, the mandates of sitting justices who have already reached this age would terminate immediately. This would result in the immediate departure of four of the 15 current justices, including the President of the Constitutional Court, Péter Polt. Their successors are expected to be elected by Parliament under the existing appointment rules.
• Extended institutional autonomy: The President of the Constitutional Court would be elected by the justices for a three-year term with the possibility of re-election, replacing the current system under which parliament elects the President. In addition, the term of office of Constitutional Court justices would be reduced from 12 to nine years.
• Restoration of review powers: The amendment would repeal the restrictions currently limiting the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction to review budgetary and tax legislation while public debt exceeds 50% of GDP. The Constitutional Court would once again be entitled to exercise full constitutional review in these areas.

Changes to the judiciary

The amendment would change the way the leadership of Hungary’s two central judicial bodies is chosen. 

Under the proposed rules, the President of the National Office for the Judiciary (NOJ), the central organ of judicial self-government, would be appointed through a three-tier procedure:

• First, the judiciary itself puts forward up to three candidates under rules laid down in a cardinal act; 
• The President of the Republic proposes one of those candidates to be elected by parliament; and
• Finally, parliament confirms the appointment by a two-thirds vote for a nine-year term. 

An identical procedure would govern the appointment of the President of the Curia (Hungary’s supreme court).

A particularly notable innovation is that both the President of the NOJ and the President of the Curia would be removable through a judge-initiated procedure for recall regulated by cardinal legislation, which represents a substantial step toward judicial self-governance. The National Judicial Council would continue to oversee the central administration of the court system.

Term limits for MPs

The amendment would introduce a new eligibility requirement for Members of Parliament (MPs). Individuals who have served as MPs for a cumulative period of at least 12 years, or who have been elected to Parliament on three occasions, would no longer be eligible to stand for election.

The restriction would apply exclusively to national MPs and would not extend to local government representatives, mayors or Members of the European Parliament. Existing mandates would remain unaffected, and the new rule would only take effect from the next parliamentary elections.

National Asset Recovery and Protection Office

The amendment would also enshrine the National Asset Recovery and Protection Office (NVVH) as an independent constitutional body to protect public assets and recover unlawfully used public funds. The establishment of the NVVH should dispel doubts about the use of public assets in Hungary and restore public confidence in the transparency of the management of public assets.

The NVVH is characterised as an independent body, acting as public prosecutor to enforce the state’s criminal law claims within the NVVH’s jurisdiction. Its constitutional mandate includes exercising rights in connection with criminal investigations, representing the prosecution in court proceedings, and carrying out asset recovery and protection tasks.

The Office’s President and Vice-Presidents would be elected by a two-thirds parliamentary majority for six-year terms. All staff members are prohibited from party membership or political activity. The detailed organisational rules are reserved for a cardinal act. (For more details, see our previous article here).

Elevating the NVVH to constitutional rank means that the body’s existence and core mandate can only be altered through a constitutional amendment, which provides businesses and investors with a degree of certainty that the NVVH and the enforcement framework around it will remain a permanent feature of the Hungarian legal landscape.

Further notable changes

• Removal of law-making powers of regulatory agencies: The amendment would abolish the constitutional status of autonomous regulatory bodies (i.e. regulatory agencies empowered under the Constitution to regulate certain sectors through decrees having the force of law). At present, four such bodies exist:
  • the National Media and Telecommunications Authority;
  • the Hungarian Energy and Utilities Regulatory Office;
  • the Supervisory Authority for Regulatory Affairs; and
  • the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority.

As a result of the proposed amendment, decrees issued by these bodies would no longer have the force of law. According to the explanatory memorandum, the constitutional regulation of these agencies were an unjustified exception to the general principle of democratic legitimacy.

• Fiscal Council veto powers over central budget abolished: The amendment would abolish the veto powers of the Fiscal Council, a three-member body tasked with assessing the sustainability of central budgets. Under the current constitutional framework, parliament may adopt the annual central budget only with the Council’s approval. Such approval may be withheld where the proposed budget would result in public debt exceeding 50% of GDP or would increase the level of public debt while it already exceeds that threshold.
• Significant reduction in the scope of cardinal laws: The amendment would substantially reduce the number of subject matters requiring regulation through cardinal laws, which currently require a two-thirds parliamentary majority for adoption and amendment. This would broaden the scope for legislation to be enacted by a simple parliamentary majority. As a result, several areas currently subject to cardinal legislation could in future be regulated through ordinary acts of Parliament, including:
  • provisions concerning arable land and national assets;
  • the fundamental rules of the pension system;
  • certain operational matters of the Hungarian National Bank and the State Audit Office;
  • the institutional framework governing freedom of information.

Key insights

While many of the proposed reforms concern the structure and operation of state institutions, they have the following important implications for Hungary’s regulatory and legislative environment: 

• The reduction in the number of matters requiring a two-thirds parliamentary majority and the abolition of certain institutional veto mechanisms could enable legislative change in a range of policy areas, even in potential future scenarios where there is no two-thirds majority in Parliament;
• The judicial reforms point toward a judiciary with stronger institutional safeguards and self-governance, which could enhance the consistency and perceived neutrality of outcomes in commercial and administrative disputes over time;
• Elevating the NVVH to the constitutional level signals the body will be an important tool for overseeing public funds, combating misuse of public funds and will replace the general prosecution service in cases within its jurisdiction.

Given the expressly transitional nature of the amendment, businesses should closely monitor the constitution-drafting process since further significant institutional, regulatory and governance-related reforms may follow over the coming months and years.

For more information on the proposed changes and how they could impact your business operations in Hungary, contact your CMS client partner or the CMS experts who contributed to this article.

This article was co-authored by Lilla Vereska, Lili Kovács, Gábor Ratkovics.