Between August and October 2026, the Gambling Commission (the “Commission”) announced regulatory settlements with online operator QuinnBet (Gibraltar) Limited (“QuinnBet”) and three land-based casino operators: Grosvenor Casinos Limited (“Grosvenor”), Grosvenor Casinos (GC) Limited and Gaming Group Limited. It also announced the suspension of the remote operating licence held by Targetlocal Limited (“Targetlocal”).
These regulatory outcomes follow enforcement action concerning software suppliers and operators announced in June and July 2026 (as we reported in our previous update).
1. QuinnBet – Regulatory Settlement
On 20 August 2026, the Commission announced a regulatory settlement with QuinnBet, which operates quinnbet.com. A compliance assessment identified anti-money laundering (“AML”) and social responsibility (“SR”) failings, prompting the Commission to commence a review of QuinnBet’s remote operating licence under section 116 of the Gambling Act 2005 (the “Act”).
The Commission found breaches of the following Licence Conditions and Codes of Practice (“LCCP”):
- paragraphs 2 and 3 of licence condition 12.1.1, concerning AML and counter-terrorism financing controls;
- paragraphs 1, 3, 5(a) – (c), 7, 8, 9, 11 and 13 of Social Responsibility Code Provision (“SRCP”) 3.4.3, concerning remote customer interaction; and
- paragraph 1 of SRCP 3.4.4, concerning financial vulnerability checks.
AML failings
The Commission found that, between March 2023 and August 2025, QuinnBet had:
- failed to address AML risks from disproportionate spending promptly: one customer earning around £2,000 monthly deposited and lost £9,000 in four days;
- relied excessively on source of wealth (“SoW”) without adequately establishing source of funds (“SoF”), including assuming that deposits represented recycled winnings without supporting evidence;
- failed to ensure Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”) were submitted as soon as practicable once the suspicion threshold was met; and
- allowed 194 customers to exceed intended deposit limits after human and software errors during a platform migration caused two controls to fail.
Social responsibility failings
The Commission found that, between October 2023 and August 2025, QuinnBet had:
- failed to implement deposit safeguards effectively: a platform migration disrupted controls, while delays in manually applying lower limits for customers aged 18 to 24 permitted excess deposits that could still be lost after limits were applied;
- used ineffective harm-detection controls: loss-limit alerts were triggered only on a further deposit after losses exceeded the limit, while algorithms missed high deposits, rapid play, increasing stakes, bet volumes and turnover. One customer placed approximately 4,800 bets one day and 7,000 the next without being flagged;
- relied on reports produced the following morning for most harm indicators, with reviews occasionally delayed for a second day because of staffing issues;
- conducted insufficiently detailed reviews, focusing on finances rather than harm indicators and failing to consider earlier reports, reviews and the effectiveness of previous interactions. Action was not always prompt, tailored or escalated;
- relied on manual review and suspension, without automation, despite its policies requiring immediate suspension for strong harm indicators; and
- failed to conduct required financial vulnerability checks on time following the platform migration, allowing excess spending.
Regulatory settlement
The regulatory settlement comprised:
- a £609,104 payment in lieu of a financial penalty, including £193,118 disgorgement, to the Government’s Consolidated Fund;
- agreement to the publication of a statement of facts in this case; and
- a contribution to investigation costs.
The Commission identified its previously issued public statements regarding similar issues in relation to other operators as an aggravating factor. Mitigating factors included QuinnBet’s cooperation and prompt provision of information, swift implementation of a remedial action plan and frequent updates, early voluntary reporting and acceptance of failings, voluntary divestment of funds accrued through some of the failings, and lack of previous regulatory enforcement action.
Comment
This settlement emphasises the importance of effective controls and prompt action on both AML and SR risks. As highlighted in our previous update, operators should set clear timescales for actions and interactions, and support staff with appropriate training. John Pierce, the Commission’s Director of Enforcement, highlighted that this case demonstrates the consequences of controls that are “unable to identify and respond to indicators of harm and financial crime quickly enough”.
Operators should also ensure that manual processes do not delay safeguards or allow gambling above intended limits pending staff review. SRCP 3.4.3 requires automated action on strong harm indicators, as defined in the operator’s processes, alongside individual manual review. Reliance solely on manual review will not satisfy that requirement, and manual and automated controls should be tested together, including before and after any IT changes, with ongoing monitoring and quality assurance to identify weaknesses.
Where winnings have been withdrawn, operators should obtain appropriate evidence before treating subsequent deposits as recycled winnings. The Commission’s 2019/20 and 2020/21 enforcement reports warned that later deposits could represent fresh criminal funds, and criticised operators for accepting customers’ explanations without independent verification or challenge. Operators should therefore ensure that their SoF procedures address this risk and are applied consistently in practice.
Finally, operators should apply the lessons from enforcement against other businesses. As we have previously noted, public statements concerning similar failings can be an aggravating factor, as they were here.
2. Targetlocal – Licence Suspension
On 21 September 2026, the Commission announced that it had suspended Targetlocal’s combined remote operating licence following enquiries which identified AML failings. Targetlocal trades as Ken Howell’s Sports Betting and operates kenhowells.com. The suspension covers its online casino, sports betting and virtual event betting business.
The Commission has commenced a review of that licence under section 116 of the Act and stated that the suspension will remain in place until it is satisfied that the business is compliant.
Comment
As set out in its Licensing, Compliance and Enforcement Policy, a licence may be suspended at the outset of, or during, a review where the Commission suspects, among other things, a breach of licence conditions or activity inconsistent with the licensing objectives.
Suspension is a significant intervention, preventing an operator from carrying on the affected licensed activities. The Commission’s Indicative Sanctions Guidance identifies serious ongoing breaches and risks to consumers or the wider public as factors which may justify suspension following a review. Targetlocal’s review remains ongoing and detailed findings have not been published. The decision nevertheless indicates that the Commission considered its AML concerns sufficiently serious to warrant the suspension of the affected activities while it investigates.
3. Grosvenor – Regulatory Settlement
On 7 October 2026, the Commission announced a regulatory settlement following a review of Grosvenor’s licence under section 116 of the Act, which identified failings in its AML and SR controls. The settlement was agreed on behalf of Grosvenor, and two other entities in the wider Rank Group plc, Grosvenor Casinos (GC) Limited and Gaming Group Limited, , as the group adopted the same policies, procedures and controls.
The Commission acknowledged that Grosvenor had acted promptly to introduce changes designed to remedy the failings and had fully cooperated with the investigation.
The settlement includes a £5,012,261 payment in lieu of a financial penalty on behalf of Grosvenor and the wider group to the Government’s Consolidated Fund, together with a contribution to investigation costs. The public statement also records a commitment to an external audit of Grosvenor’s business within six months of the conclusion of the licence review.
Comment
The settlement serves as a reminder that the Commission’s enforcement activity extends across both online and land-based gambling. Sue Young, the Commission’s Executive Director of Operations, emphasised that “the risks of anti-money laundering and social responsibility failures are equally alive in the land-based sector”.
For operators with multiple premises, this highlights the importance of applying group policies consistently at venue level. Staff should have clear guidance on the evidence required for AML decisions and when to escalate concerns, supported by appropriate training and regular compliance monitoring. Quality assurance reviews should also assess whether safer gambling interactions are effective and whether further action is needed. An assessment of a customer’s financial circumstances should not replace consideration of indicators of gambling harm.
