No anonymity after acquittal: court upholds open justice in DPA case

Introduction

R (on the application of Simms-Davies) v Southwark Crown Court [2026] EWHC 337 (Admin).

This judicial review arose after the Crown Court judge who had approved two deferred prosecution agreements (“DPAs”) involving Bluu Solutions and Tetris‑Projects decided to publish her earlier judgment in a de‑anonymised form once related criminal proceedings into individuals had concluded. During the DPA process, the judge anonymised individuals referred to in the Statement of Facts—including the claimant, Mr Simms‑Davies—and postponed publication to avoid prejudicing ongoing trials. After Mr Simms‑Davies and the other defendants were acquitted at trial, the Judge lifted the restrictions and issued a judgment which gave their names.  Mr Simms‑Davies challenged this, arguing that he was not a party to the DPA proceedings, had never been named in open court, and that the judge applied the wrong legal test by treating his position as akin to an application for a reporting restriction. The judicial review therefore centred on whether the judge lawfully applied open justice principles in deciding to de‑anonymise the judgment. 

The key points arising from the judicial review judgment are:

1. Approval of DPAs is a judicial act subject to open justice

The Divisional Court confirmed that approving a DPA is part of the administration of justice. Although DPAs result from negotiations between the SFO and a company, the court’s approval—and its reasons—must normally be given publicly. 

2. Anonymity is exceptional and requires necessity

The Court reaffirmed that open justice is the starting point. Individuals’ names should be published unless withholding them is necessary to protect an individual’s Article 8 rights (i.e. the right to respect for private and family life under the European Convention on Human Rights). The burden lies on the individual seeking anonymity. 

Accordingly, acquittal does not guarantee continued anonymity. Once proceedings are over, courts will usually publish full judgments unless compelling reasons justify a departure.

3. Publication after acquittal is not unfair where no findings are made

The claimant argued that naming him in the DPA judgment  implied wrongdoing when he had, in fact, been acquitted of all charges. The Court rejected this, noting that the Crown Court judge made no findings of fact against individuals and expressly stated in the DPA judgment that the individuals had not been asked to comment on the Statement of Facts. Furthermore, the claimant could already be identified publicly through SFO reporting. Retaining anonymity in the DPA judgment was therefore described as “confusing and pointless.” 

This suggests that where individuals’ names are already publicly connected to the events, courts are unlikely to maintain anonymity in DPA judgments.

4. No special confidentiality rule applies to DPAs

The claimant argued that because individuals cannot comment on the agreed facts in a DPA, DPA judgments should attract a special approach to anonymity. The Court was clear: they do not. Open justice applies unless statutory restrictions or a proven necessity justify a derogation. 

Comment

This case highlights the imbalance of interests and power between corporate entities seeking to enter into DPAs and the individuals implicated in the wrongdoing that is the subject of that DPA.  While true that the courts will typically protect against publication of individuals’ names prior to trial, that protection ends once their liability has been determined, regardless of whether they are found guilty or not.

This can lead to situations where an individual is named in documents published alongside the DPA (i.e. the Statement of Facts and judgment), even when they are found by a jury not to have committed any crime. The Court, rightly or wrongly, downplayed the impact of this by pointing to the fact that the DPA judgment confirmed there were no findings in relation to individuals and they had no input into the Statement of Facts. We expect this will be of little solace to many of those who have cleared their names but remain intrinsically linked to the wrongdoing by the public record. It may also change the incentives for companies and individual directors considering the possibility of a DPA – any perceived stigma thereof is now less likely to be confined to the corporate entity. 

Individuals linked to DPA-related conduct should seek early, independent advice on their positions, even where they may not themselves yet be under investigation or subject to charges.