The High Court has recently added another decision to the substantial case law in the area of undue influence. For a general background to the area, see article “Etridge: Guidelines for banks when taking security over the matrimonial home www.law-now.com/law-now/press.cfm?id=3820
In many of these cases, the claim has been that a husband induced his wife to enter into a transaction disadvantageous to herself, through improper coercion and abuse of a dominant position in their relationship. In this case, the same factors were alleged, but against a wife in relation to her dying husband.
The defendant Jean Glanville, was accused by the children of her deceased husband, Jim Glanville, of improperly inducing their father to execute a deed of gift of his home into the joint names of himself and Jean. The deed ensured that the house would pass to her in its entirety upon her death and after her own death, to her family from her first marriage, rather than to Mr Glanville’s children from his first marriage.
The House of Lords have recently defined undue influence as an “unacceptable form of persuasion. This will take one of two forms. It may be overt pressure or coercion, or it may be that in a relationship where one party places all their trust and confidence in the other, the dominant party unfairly takes advantage of that influence, exploiting the vulnerability of the other.
In some circumstances, the court may be prepared to infer from the fact that the transaction was so disadvantageous to the complainant that it must have been procured by undue influence. Here, Mr Glanville’s family did not adduce much evidence that there had been overt threats or pressure by the wife. The thrust of their argument was that they could not believe that Mr Glanville would have deliberately disinherited his family. They submitted that Jean’s improper influence was the only explanation for him, in effect, signing away his house to her and her family.
Park J held that in certain cases, the facts do speak for themselves; the court might be convinced that if the gift had not been procured by undue influence, it would never have been made. The burden of proof would then shift to the defendant to show that undue influence had not been brought to bear. However, in this case, although improper pressure applied by the wife was one possible explanation, there were others which were also consistent with the facts.
Park J held that the doctrine of undue influence is not to protect people from “the consequences of their own folly, but to “save them from being victimised by other people. Therefore, the fact that had Mr Glanville thought about the matter more fully, he might have chosen not to make the gift, was not sufficient for the deed of gift to be set aside.
It was also relevant that the wife had instructed a solicitor to come and visit her and Mr Glanville in the house, and allowed the solicitor to interview Mr Glanville for at least half an hour. During this time the solicitor had a general discussion with Mr Glanville, satisfied himself that Mr Glanville was mentally fit, and explained the nature of the document and what would happen to the property after his death.
Park J held that the engagement of a solicitor was not determinative, but it was a “pointer away from the inference of improper pressure which the court was being asked to draw. Park J also held that the position of the solicitor instructed by the wife was not the same as that of solicitors who are routinely asked by banks to confirm that a husband (or more commonly, a wife) understands the effects of acting as a surety for debts taken on by their partner. The solicitor’s task was not to make inquiries that would ascertain whether undue influence had been brought to bear. Rather, his function was only to explain the effect of the deed and establish that Mr Glanville was of sufficient mental capacity to enter into it. (On the other hand, while it was not the solicitor’s function to look out for evidence of undue influence, it was relevant that he did not in fact see any).
The Judge concluded that this was not a case in which the burden of proving that there had been no undue influence passed to the defendant. Instead, the burden stayed with the claimants to show that undue influence had been exerted, and they had failed to do this.
The case is not one which substantially progresses the law in this area. However it does offer some further guidance as to the court’s approach to such cases and in particular the weight given to particular aspects of the evidence.
For further information, please contact Emily Springford at emily.springford@cms-cmck.com or on +44 (0)20 7367 2370 or Mathew Carey at mathew.carey@cms-cmck.com or on +44 (0)20 7367 2457.
