High Court dismisses all seven phone-hacking claims against Associated Newspapers
Introduction
As has been widely reported, Mr Justice Nicklin has handed down judgment in the case of Baroness Lawrence of Clarendon OBE & Ors v Associated Newspapers Limited [2026] EWHC 1637 (KB) dismissing the claims of all seven claimants. The well-known claimants (Baroness Lawrence of Clarendon OBE, Elizabeth Hurley, Sir Elton John CH CBE, David Furnish, Sir Simon Hughes, Prince Harry (the Duke of Sussex), and Sadie Frost Law) brought claims against Associated Newspapers (“Associated”), the publisher of the Daily Mail, the Mail on Sunday, and the MailOnline, for misuse of private information (and for Baroness Lawrence, breach of confidence) by obtaining private and/or confidential information using deceptive techniques such as phone hacking, “blagging”, and the use of private investigators. The claims, issued in October 2022, concerned dozens of articles published mainly between the late 1990s and early to mid-2000s. Associated denied the allegations and argued that many claims were, in any event, time barred.
The issues
The court was required to decide four main issues: (1) how the court should approach incomplete evidence and general allegations of wrongdoing when assessing decades-old claims; (2) whether the newspaper's use of third-party investigators supported a finding that specific articles were obtained unlawfully; (3) whether unlawful information gathering was proved in relation to the individual articles relied on by each claimant; and (4) whether, and when, any claims were time-barred.
The judge acknowledged that what was in dispute was not whether the information itself that was alleged to have been obtained unlawfully was private or intrusive, but rather whether the information used in the Article (as defined) or incident was the product of unlawful information gathering.
The decision has received a lot of media attention, but what are the issues of principle that matter for practitioners and potential parties to future claims?
The judgment, spanning 1,606 paragraphs, addresses (and restates) a number of helpful legal principles concerning the standard and burden of proof for serious allegations, the limits of propensity evidence, pleading discipline, and the statutory framework of limitation.
Standard of proof
The judge confirmed the claimants were required to prove their allegations on the balance of probabilities, adhering to the civil standard of proof. However, where the allegations are more serious or improbable (for example, where they relate to allegations of dishonesty and deliberately false evidence) as was the case here, the court requires “more convincing” evidence before finding such allegations proved.[1]
This is a useful reminder that, while there is only one civil standard, the practical evidential threshold adjusts in proportion to the gravity of the allegation. The judge emphasised that “suspicion, even understandable suspicion, is not proof.”[2]
The limits of the claimants’ evidence and allegations
The judge set out a number of limitations to the claimants’ case, which impacted his assessment of the evidence:
- Pleading discipline: the claimants were required to evidence each allegation in relation to a particular Article or incident. The court could not determine unpleaded allegations or permit general allegations of unlawful information gathering.
- The limits of propensity evidence: the judge emphasised that propensity evidence (or similar fact evidence) could support an inference of a probative or relevant issue[3] but this should still be rooted in evidence relating to the specific claimant’s claim. This was not to be a public inquiry into Associated’s general practices. The judge made it clear that the same limitations applied to use of materials from other phone hacking litigation.
- The issue of human memory: many of the facts of the case arose around 20-30 years ago, with an inevitable impact on the quality of the evidence (both in physical form, but also in terms of oral evidence). The judge relied on the well-known caution from Gestmin SGPS SA v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd [2013] EWHC 3560 (Comm), a case which emphasised that facts are better established by inferences raised by contemporaneous documents or known / probable facts, rather than recollection evidence, even if they are honestly believed to be true.
- Missing documents: the judge was careful to hold that an incomplete documentary record does not reverse the burden of proof. Absences of material may impact the inferences a court can make in relation to the allegations.
- Adverse inferences from absent witnesses: the judge restated established case law from Efobi v Royal Mail Group Ltd [2021] UKSC 33, Wisniewski (A Minor) v Central Manchester Health Authority [1998] EWCA Civ 596, and Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464. In order for an adverse inference to be invoked, it is necessary to consider the issue on which the inference is sought, the precise inference which is said to arise, whether the issue on which the absent witness could give evidence is a live one, whether it is reasonable to expect the witness to have given evidence on this issue or others, and how significant these issues are to the case as a whole. The court will also consider the reasons for absence.[4]
Applying these principles, the judge then examined each claimant’s case in turn, working through the evidence on every Article or incident in careful detail.
The decision
Turning to the dozens of Articles and incidents the claimants relied on, the judge found that Associated had, in most cases, put forward a credible, lawful explanation for how each Article had been sourced, for example, from material already in the public domain, legitimate tip-offs, or other usual journalistic channels. Where the claimants tried to introduce new and more serious theories at trial (such as allegations of voicemail interception) which had not been properly set out in their pleaded case, the judge treated this as a significant weakness, noting that serious allegations of this kind should be clearly pleaded and evidenced before being put to a witness.
The judge proceeded to take the court through each individual claim, dismissing each of them, because the claims had not discharged the burden of unlawful information gathering.
Limitation
The judge acknowledged that, given he had dismissed the claimants’ claims, it was not strictly necessary for him to determine Associated’s defence of limitation. However, he did provide a helpful summary of the issue of limitation nonetheless at paragraphs 1447 – 1604.
The judge confirmed that a claimant relying on concealment under s32(1)(b) of the Limitation Act 1980 to extend a limitation period must show they could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered enough facts to bring a worthwhile claim earlier. On the facts, he found that at least two of the claimants would, in any event, have had sufficient knowledge to bring related claims by April 2016, some six years before proceedings were issued. As such, these claims would have been time-barred if they had exceeded the evidential threshold required to establish unlawful information gathering.
Comment
The judgment underscores that it will not be easy for claimants to prove unlawful information gathering and that decisions will be highly fact specific.
However, it does contain helpful guidance for a broader category of civil claims about historic conduct. The judgment is a reminder that general suspicion, incomplete records, or evidence of wrongdoing in some instances will rarely be enough on their own to prove misconduct in a specific case; a clear, evidenced link between the alleged wrongdoing and the particular event in question is usually required.
From a practitioner’s point of view, it also underlines the importance of pleading serious allegations clearly and early. Courts will treat allegations that only emerge or expand during cross-examination or closing submissions with caution.
For businesses facing legacy claims or probes into old conduct, practical steps worth considering include reviewing document retention policies to ensure a defensible account can be given of why records are missing and building a clear factual record contemporaneously wherever possible.
A consequential hearing has been listed for 29–30 July 2026.
For further information, please email the authors or your usual CMS contact.
This article was prepared with the assistance of Shabbir Bokhari, trainee in CMS London.
[1] See judgment paragraphs 40-41. In making this point, Nicklin relied on In re H (Minors) [1996] AC 563 at 586, Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [2003] 2 AC 1 at 181, and JSC BM Bank v Kekhman [2018] EWHC 791 (Comm) at 55.
[2] See judgment paragraph 1407.
[3] The judge applied the two-stage test in O’Brien v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2005] 2 AC 534 to determine whether probative evidence could be used: it must be (i) logically probative and (ii) carefully case managed.
[4] See judgment paragraph 60.
