Health and safety at work: Is a door closer “work equipment”?

A simple door-closing device was the focus of the recent judgement of the House of Lords in the case of Peter Spencer-Franks v Kellogg Brown & Root and others [2008] UKHL 46. The case has established that a door closing device (here used to ensure that the door of the control room on an offshore installation was closed) was "work equipment" in terms of Regulation 2 of the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998 ("PUWER").

The case concerned an incident that occurred on 12 October 2003 whilst the Appellant was employed by Kellogg Brown & Root ("KBR") under contract for services to the operator of a North Sea installation. As part of the Appellant’s work activities, he was asked to inspect a door-closer on the installation and repair it. When the appellant tried to inspect the door closer, a screw became disengaged from it and struck the appellant in the face, causing him personal injury. The Appellant brought a claim in Aberdeen Sheriff Court claiming both his employers (KBR) and the operator of the installation, were in breach of their duties under PUWER. The House of Lords were asked to consider whether the door closer was work equipment for the purpose of PUWER.

Regulation 2(1) of PUWER defines work equipment as:

"Any machinery, appliance, apparatus, tool or installation for use at work (whether exclusively or not)"

In deciding that the door closer should correctly be classified as "work equipment", the Court looked at the purpose of PUWER, which was to implement the terms of the Work Equipment Directive (89/655/EEC) ("the Directive"). Lord Hoffman identified that the test required consideration of the purpose of the equipment - if it was for use at work, then it would be work equipment. On this analysis, the outcome for the door closer was clear as it was demonstrably in place on the installation as equipment for use at work. The Court confirmed that PUWER should not be unnecessarily restricted on the question of what constitutes work equipment, particularly when the purpose of the Directive was to provide comprehensive protection to workers.

The argument that PUWER impliedly excluded apparatus that formed part of the structure of premises (or installation) was rejected by the Court. The Lords held that PUWER was intended to apply to all equipment on an offshore structure, regardless of whether it was integrated into the structure of the installation or not. This seems slightly at odds with Health and Safety Executive guidance, which indicates the definition of work equipment, though wide ranging, would not cover permanently installed systems such as fire detection systems or life-saving appliances.

Arguments that the act of repairing the door closer did not constitute pure "use" of work equipment were also rejected. As Lord Rodger indicated, in interpreting what activities could fall within the PUWER classification, the word "use" should be given its ordinary meaning. Accordingly inspecting and repairing the door closer during work activities would be "use" in this scenario.

To a certain extent, the judgement still leaves some unanswered questions. The contractual arrangement between KBR and the operator of the installation provided that KBR would indemnify the operator for damages arising from an injury to KBR personnel. Whilst duties under PUWER are imposed on the party that has control of the work equipment (usually the employer but in this case the operator), the Respondents confirmed to the Court that if the operator were held liable, that they were content that KBR, as employers, should also be liable. The door closer in question was the property of the operator and in the operator’s control at the time of the accident. On what basis KBR’s liability arose, when they had no control over the equipment in question, was not considered by the Court and may be something that will need to be addressed in future cases.

For now, however, the Court was content to leave the issue of KBR’s liability to one side in favour of clarifying the extent of the definition of "work equipment". The implications of the decision are likely to be wide reaching. Those in control of workplace equipment should now review existing arrangements to ensure that all workplace equipment that might be classified as such in light of this case, has been adequately assessed against the standards imposed by PUWER.

A copy of the judgement is available by clicking here.