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Introduction to the directive - its legal basis and how it may test the limits of competence under Art. 83(1) TFEU

EU Anti-Corruption Directive: CMS / Kings College London Collaboration

12 Nov 2026 United Kingdom 11 min read

This blog post marks the first in a series of blog posts on the new EU Anti-Corruption Directive. These posts, which will be published regularly over the remainder of 2026 and early 2027, are the product of a collaboration between the Centre for European law at King’s College London and international law firm CMS.

It is almost trite to point out the corrosive social and economic effect of corruption. Institutionalised corruption threatens the stability and security of states, including by enabling organised and other serious crime. Corruption jeopardises development, prosperity and the sustainability and inclusiveness of economies. It undermines democratic institutions and the values upon which Member States and the European Union are founded, such as the rule of law, democracy and the protection of fundamental rights.

There can be little doubt that corruption remains a significant problem within the European Union. The latest available Eurobarometer survey data suggests that 71% of Europeans consider that corruption is widespread in their country, with 69% agreeing that high-level corruption cases are not pursued sufficiently in their country.

Against this background, the recently adopted Directive (EU) 2026/1021 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Combatting Corruption (the EU Anti-Corruption Directive) represents a major step forward in the harmonisation of criminal law at EU level. The Directive’s main aim is to strengthen the Union’s response to corruption through a combination of criminal-law harmonisation, prevention measures and enhanced cross-border cooperation.

The majority of the Directive is due to be implemented into the national laws of Member States by 1 June 2028. It can be expected to have a significant effect on both the enforcement of corruption laws and the prominence of issues as central to the EU as productivity and security.

We argue that the Directive is an example of the EU testing the limits of its legal competency under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in order to provide an effective response to an active threat to the stability of the Union.

According to the European Commission, the pre-existing body of national and European anti-corruption law was not sufficiently comprehensive and did not adequately address evolving corruption threats. As many practitioners can testify, there were enforcement gaps at national level, as well as obstacles to effective cooperation between competent Member State authorities. The Directive also seeks to give effect to the Union's obligations under the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and, where possible, to go beyond its minimum requirements. The Commisson’s claim is that, the EU legal framework on combatting corruption needed to be updated and expanded to ensure a more coherent and effective response to corruption in the Union.

In pursuit of these objectives, the EU Anti-Corruption Directive provides for a three-pronged approach, providing for measures which harmonise substantive laws, enhance cross-border judicial and law-enforcement cooperation and create new institutional capacity.

1. Harmonisation of substantive criminal law 

The first is minimum harmonisation of aspects of substantive criminal law. The Directive establishes minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences, as well as criminal and non-criminal penalties in the area of corruption (Article 1). This is not the place to compare and contrast specific definitions between the Directive and other regimes such as the US FCPA, the Criminal Codes of Member States or the UK Bribery Act. It suffices to say for now that the Directive employs familiar underlying concepts (such as the concept of breach of duty as an essential characteristic of a bribery offence), with the result that the resulting definitions should align easily with existing Member-State laws and principles.

Relevant offences include, inter alia, bribery in the public and private sectors, misappropriation, trading in influence, unlawful exercise of public functions, enrichment from corruption offences etc. (Articles 3-11).

The Directive establishes criminal liability for individuals and, importantly, liability for legal persons, requiring Member States to implement effective, proportionate, and dissuasive penalties (Articles 12–14). There are also harmonised minimum rules for elements of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in relation to many of the corruption crimes listed in the Directive (Articles 15-16). The Directive sets down minimum requirements pertaining to limitation periods to allow for sufficient time to prosecute those corruption offenses (Article 19). Finally, the Directive requires Member States to ensure that immunities from investigation and prosecution given to national officials in respect of the criminal offenses set down in the Directive can be lifted. This is unless it is contrary to the Member State’s “constitutions, constitutional principles and laws” (Article 17).

The legal basis for harmonising common corruption offences and penalties in the ways noted above is Article 83(1) TFEU. This provision allows the Parliament and Council, operating via the ordinary legislative procedure, to adopt Directives which establish minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension, including corruption.

Article 83(1) TFEU is supplemented by Article 83(2) TFEU, which further allows the EU legislature to adopt Directives setting down minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions where this is essential to ensure the effective implementation of an EU policy in an area that has already been subject to harmonisation measures. In this regard, the EU Anti-Corruption Directive amends (Directive (EU) 2017/1371) on fighting fraud and other criminal offences affecting the Union’s financial interests in order to bring aspects of its corruption regime into alignment with the new framework.

So far, so competent. The EU legislature clearly possesses the competence to lay down minimum rules concerning the definition of corruption offences and sanctions, and the provisions cited above fall explicitly within that framework.

However, as outlined above, the Directive goes a good deal further than the harmonisation prong, expressly provided for in the TFEU.

2. Enhancing cross-border judicial cooperation 

The second prong entails enhancing cross-border judicial cooperation. Article 82(1)(d) TFEU provides the EU legislature with competence to enact measures which facilitate cooperation between judicial or equivalent authorities of the Member States in relation to proceedings in criminal matters and the enforcement of decisions. Measures of cooperation enshrined in the Directive include, inter alia¸rules on settling which Member State(s) have jurisdiction over corruption offences (Article 18) and information-sharing with relevant Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies (Article 32).

One intriguing provision is Article 28 of the Directive. It requires Member States to ensure that Europol’s Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA) is used for the exchange of information between competent law enforcement authorities. This is to be done in accordance with Directive (EU) 2023/977 on the exchange of information between the law enforcement authorities of Member States.

On one view, law enforcement authorities exchanging information is, strictly speaking, police cooperation, not judicial cooperation. This does not seem to sit comfortably within the scope of Article 82(1)(d) TFEU, which deals with “facilitating cooperation between judicial or equivalent authorities in relation to proceedings in criminal matters and the enforcement of decisions.” Instead, this information exchange seems to fall much more naturally within Article 87 et seq of the TFEU, entitled Police Cooperation. Notably, these provisions were not included as a legal basis for the EU Anti-Corruption Directive.

It may be argued argue that reference in Article 82(1)(d) to cooperation between “judicial or equivalent authorities” extends to law enforcement authorities. However, even if one accepts this interpretation, one would still need to argue that information exchange between law enforcement authorities forms part of “proceedings in criminal matters and the enforcement of decisions.” One supposes that an expansive reading of “proceedings in criminal matters” could sustain this, especially considering the fact that it is common for police authorities of Member States to act, in effect, as agents of and under the supervision of judicial authorities when gathering evidence.

Nevertheless, it is notable that the Directive appears to require an expansive interpretation of judicial cooperation under Art 82(1)(d) in circumstances where a separate legal bases on information exchange in Police Cooperation exists. This is all the more remarkable when one considers that the aforementioned Directive 2023/977, which is explicitly cited in Article 28 of the Anti-Corruption Directive, has Article 87(2)(a) as its legal basis, which allows for the collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of relevant information amongst law enforcement authorities.

There is no doubt that law-enforcement cooperation and judicial cooperation can, both conceptually and practically, overlap in the area of freedom, security and justice. The fact that a specific provision of EU legislation could potentially have been adopted under a different legal basis in the Treaties does not necessarily, in itself, render the chosen legal basis incorrect. According to settled case law of the CJEU, the choice of legal basis must depend upon objective factors amenable to judicial review, including the aim and content of the measure as a whole. Where the measure pursues one predominant purpose and others are merely incidental, the measure should be adopted on the legal basis corresponding to that predominant objective. It is only where multiple objectives are inseparably linked, and neither is secondary, that multiple legal bases are required. The core legal issue, therefore, is not whether Article 87 TFEU should have been relied upon for Article 28 of the Directive. Rather, it is whether police-information exchange constitutes a sufficiently distinct and substantial component of the Directive, such that Article 87 TFEU ought to have been included amongst its legal bases.

The better view may be that, considering the Directive as a whole, its predominant objective is combating corruption through criminal-law harmonisation and associated enforcement mechanisms. The obligation for law enforcement authorities to utilise SIENA for information exchange appears to be an ancillary measure that aims at achieving the predominant objective more effectively, so that the express reference to Art.82(1)(d) does not adversely affect its legality.

3. Structural accountability, prevention and institutional-capacity frameworks

The third prong entails the establishment by Member States of structural accountability, prevention and institutional-capacity frameworks.

For example, Article 20 includes a wealth of obligations, including to undertake quite specific awareness-raising campaigns for both the public and private sector, to take preventive measures such as ensuring transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public officials, to conduct assessments to identify sectors or occupations most at risk of corruption and to organise awareness raising campaigns in the sectors identified.

Article 21 obliges Member States to adopt and publish a national strategy on preventing and combatting corruption, in consultation with civil society, independent experts, researchers and other stakeholders.

Articles 22–24 require Member States to establish or maintain institutions, i.e. “bodies or organisational units tasked with the prevention of corruption” are both in place and possess the necessary expertise,independence, resources and training.

These are essentially institution-building measures. They may well be appropriate, even essential, to ensure the effectiveness of the EU anti-corruption initiative in general. It is nevertheless difficult to argue that many of these obligations fall clearly within the scope of Article 83(1) or (2) TFEU. They do not set down minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences or sanctions, nor do they appear to facilitate judicial cooperation in criminal matters per Article 82(1)(d) TFEU.

The question thus arises whether the Art.83 legal bases authorise only the (partial) harmonisation of substantive criminal law and judicial cooperation, or whether they also authorise the creation of a broader anti-corruption governance framework of this nature.

Whilst it is true that the Directive preserves Member State institutional and administrative autonomy and does not seek to establish a supranational anti-corruption bureaucracy, it nevertheless imposes a series of demanding minimum requirements upon national institutional arrangements. In the present authors’ view, it is at least arguable that elements of the Directive test the outer limits of what the EU legislature may be constitutionally permitted to do under Articles 82(1)(d) and 83(1) and (2) TFEU. The concept of such measures being “ancillary” to the predominant objectives of the Directive (i.e. criminal-law harmonisation / judicial cooperation) needs to do a good deal more work in the case of the institution-building measures than in the case of police cooperation pursuant to Article 28. It remains to be seen whether this aspect of the Directive is seen as setting a significant legislative precedent.

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