A new era for litigation teams following Mazur & Stuart v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB)
The court’s recent decision in Mazur has sent shockwaves through those law firms with disputes practices – its impact is not limited to just those firms with bulk claims functions but also any law firm that employs non-legally qualified staff and/or Chartered Legal Executives (who do not have litigation and advocacy practice rights) to provide litigation services. The post Mazur landscape continues to evolve and not a week has gone past where the decision has not been quoted in the legal press.
We discuss in this update the decision and its potential impact for practitioners and law firms.
Background
Sections 12 and 13 of the Legal Services Act 2007 (the “LSA”) provides that ‘the conduct of litigation’ is a ‘reserved legal activity’ which must only be performed by an ‘authorised person’ (or an exempt person – not relevant to this decision). ‘Conduct of litigation’ is defined in Schedule 2 to the LSA as meaning the issuing of proceedings in any court in England and Wales, the commencement, prosecution and defence of such proceedings and the performance of ancillary functions in relation to such proceedings. An ‘authorised person’ is someone who is authorised to carry out the particular reserved legal activity by a relevant approved regulator (section 18, LSA).
Facts
Ms Mazur and Mr Stuart (the Appellants) were subject to debt recovery proceedings brought by Charles Russell Speechlys LLP (the Respondent) for unpaid legal fees. Goldsmith Bowers Solicitors (“GBS”) was instructed to recover the debt, and a claim was issued against the Appellants. The Appellants objected to the involvement of Mr Middleton, the Head of Commercial Litigation at GBS, arguing that he was unlawfully conducting litigation against them because he did not have a practising certificate. Deputy District Judge Campbell stayed the proceedings and sought an explanation from GBS.
The matter was referred to the SRA by one of GBS’ directors; the SRA decided not to investigate GBS or Mr Middleton and expressed the view in a decision letter dated 2.12.24 that, as a result of section 21(3)(b) LSA, Mr Middleton was entitled to undertake reserved activities by virtue of his employment at a firm which was authorised and regulated by the SRA (the “SRA Decision”).
GBS applied to lift the stay on the basis that Mr Middleton was entitled to perform the work that he had done on the case (which included verifying the Particulars of Claim) because he was deemed to be an authorised person to conduct litigation as a result of section 21(3)(b) LSA and, in addition, all of the work performed by Mr Middleton had been done under the supervision of Mr Ashall, an authorised person and a director of GBS. The stay was lifted (on the basis that Mr Ashall confirmed in a witness statement that he had supervised Mr Middleton and the SRA Decision) and costs were ordered against the Appellants; the Appellants appealed to the High Court on the basis that the judge has erred on the effect of the LSA.
Decision
After hearing submissions from the parties and inviting and receiving representations from the Law Society and the SRA (who rejected the view expressed in the SRA Decision), Mr Justice Sheldon held that Mr Middleton was not entitled to conduct litigation neither in his own right (as an employee of a regulated and authorised body) nor under the supervision of Mr Ashall.
The Judge held that the wording of section 21(3)(b) LSA did not permit any unauthorised employee of an SRA authorised firm to conduct litigation, and such an interpretation was not justified by reference to a number of provisions in the LSA. He found that the conduct of litigation is a reserved legal activity that can only be undertaken by an authorised person or an exempt person (which Mr Middleton was not) and, pursuant to sections 14 to 16 LSA, it is a criminal offence for a person to carry on a reserved legal activity without being entitled to do so and for an employer (even if authorised to carry out a reserved legal activity) if one of their employees carries on a reserved legal activity without being entitled to do so.
Notably, Mr Middleton (as an employee) was permitted to support an authorised person in the carrying on of a reserved legal activity. Regrettably, the Judge did not need to decide for the purposes of the appeal whether Mr Middleton was conducting litigation under the supervision of Mr Ashall or was merely assisting or supporting him in the conduct of litigation and did not express a view on the distinction between ‘conduct’ and ‘support’.
Consequences
Given the criminal consequences of practising a reserved legal activity without authorisation, the Mazur decision has plunged certain parts of the legal profession into understandable worry and concern as to whether they have been acting unlawfully.
The central and difficult issue which impacted people and firms are trying to grapple with is the distinction between when a person is ‘supporting’ an authorised person to conduct litigation and when a person is ‘conducting’ litigation themselves (and therefore committing an offence). The Law Society has itself commented that the boundary between ‘conducting’ and ‘supporting’ litigation “remains a grey area”.
The impact upon those Chartered Legal Executives who have years of experience in conducting litigation (as employees of authorised and regulated firms) but do not have standalone litigation and advocacy practice rights is profound and distressing. It is noted that many CILEX members feel misled by the contradictory views between the SRA’s Decision (described in the judgment as “incorrect” but which clearly reflected a commonly held view), the guidance from CILEX itself and the Mazur decision.
The Mazur decision will also have a significant impact on those authorised firms who operate high volume, low value claims businesses, with large teams of non-qualified fee earners running their own caseloads under the supervision of qualified solicitors. One sector where the Mazur decision will have a profound effect is personal injury and motor claims, on both the claimant and defendant side. The sector has been squeezed hard on fees for years. On the claimant side there was the introduction of fixed fees for low value motor, EL and PL claims, fees which have changed little since 2013. On the defendant side, large insurance legal practices have competed hard on price for decades, trading profitability for the security of volume instructions on ever-shrinking insurer panels. Both sides became increasingly reliant on non-qualified legal staff to run ever larger caseloads under supervision.
It is likely that those authorised firms will need to fundamentally alter their business models and consider how to reallocate work to authorised fee earners which will undoubtedly impact overall costs, reduce profitability and arguably limit access to justice for some.
However, there may be some who will question whether if a decision like Mazur had been made earlier, the scandals which occurred from the collapse of bulk claims firms like Pure Law and SSB Law (where the supervising solicitors were greatly outnumbered by the non-qualified fee earners conducting the claims) would ever have happened.
What have the regulators said?
Without any explanation for the view set out in the SRA’s Decision, on 1.10.25, the SRA issued a statement to clarify that the Mazur decision does not alter the law and that the distinction between conducting litigation and supporting litigation is fact specific.
On 13.10.25, the Legal Services Board issued a similar statement saying that Mazur does not alter the law under the LSA but acknowledging that: “lawyers and legal professionals conducting litigation need clear and accurate information”. The LSB has said that regulators and representative bodies have agreed to “ensure a consistent approach across the sector”.
It is also noted that CILEX has issued interim advice on its website and made an urgent application to the LSB for standalone litigation practice rights for its members. CILEX Regulation is proposing to “decouple the litigation and advocacy practice rights in both sets of education standards but retain the current application requirements and routes to authorisation for each practice right individually”. It is hoped that the LSB will approve the application within 28 days.
It is anticipated that there will be further guidance from the regulators in the very near future.
What should law firms do now?
In the immediate aftermath of the Mazur decision, we are already witnessing costs arguments being raised and challenges made to Bills of Costs. In Points of Dispute, paying parties have been quick to rely on Mazur and contend that Bills of Costs should be disallowed or struck out entirely on the basis of litigation having been conducted ‘illegally’ by non-qualified fee earners.
In practise, the difference between ‘conducting’ and ‘supporting’ litigation is likely to be one of fact and degree, taking into account the activities undertaken, the level of supervision and the question of who exercises professional judgment and assume responsibility in relation to the litigation.
Pending any further guidance from the SRA, employees and law firms should ensure that individuals ‘conducting’ regulated activities are authorised and that the work undertaken by unregulated employees is limited to providing ‘assistance’ to an authorised person. This may mean significantly increasing the level of supervision provided to non-authorised employees. Law firms should engage with their PI insurers if they consider themselves to be in breach of the LSA and consider updating risk and compliance guidance for non-qualified and qualified fee-earners involved in litigation.
