High court dismisses libel claim and delivers first ruling under new SLAPP provisions

A barrister’s defamation claim against a tax blogger has been struck out and declared a “SLAPP” (strategic litigation against public participation) in the first judgment applying the anti-SLAPP provisions introduced by sections 194 and 195 of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 (“ECCTA”). The decision in Kamal v Tax Policy Associates Ltd [2026] EWHC 551 (KB) provides important guidance on the operation of the new statutory regime and illustrates the Courts’ willingness to determine defamation claims at an early stage.

Background

The Claimant, Mr Setu Kamal, was a barrister practising tax law in the UK but resident in the UAE and Cyprus. In February 2025, the Defendants, Tax Policy Associates Ltd and Dan Neidle, a former Clifford Chance tax partner, published an online article criticising tax avoidance schemes marketed by a firm called Arka Wealth, with which the Claimant was associated. The article described the schemes as “nonsense” and suggested that users would fail to save tax and instead incur substantial liabilities.

The Claimant brought claims in libel and malicious falsehood, seeking damages of £8m and an order requiring the Defendants to publish an apology. The Defendants applied for strike-out, summary judgment, and a declaration that the claim was a statutory SLAPP.

Issues before the court

Mrs Justice Collins Rice was asked to determine:

1. whether parts of the libel claim should be struck out for defective pleading;
2. whether the malicious falsehood claim should be struck out;
3. whether summary judgment should be entered for the Defendants on the basis of an honest opinion defence; and
4. whether the claim constituted a SLAPP under section 195 of ECCTA. 

1. Strike-out of defective pleadings

The Court struck out several aspects of the Claimant’s claim.

First, the claim sought to base a libel action partly on the URL "slug" of the article, the short descriptor following the domain name or main path, arguing it could be read independently of the article itself.  The Court held this was inconsistent with the Charleston rule, the long-established principle that a publication must be read as a whole. The Court reasoned that as a “slug” is the portion of a web address designed to describe the subject matter of the linked article, thereby functioning as a form of headline, it cannot give rise to a libel claim independently of the article to which it relates.

Second, the Claimant had pleaded that the article falsely stated a court had found him in breach of his duties to the court.  The Court held that the Claimant’s claim, that it was false and misleading to suggest a judicial finding of breach, was “impossible to square” as the Divisional Court had made an express and definitive finding that the Claimant breached his duty to the court. This could not be characterised as provisional and that aspect of the libel claim was therefore struck out as an abuse of process.

Third, the Claimant sought a court-ordered apology as a remedy. The Court confirmed that “a defendant’s apology can feature in a libel remedy only where made voluntarily” and that the Court itself has no power to order an apology in defamation proceedings, as established in Hamaizia v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2014] EWHC 3408 (QB). Such an order would constitute compelled speech engaging ECHR Article 10 rights.  

2. Failure to plead malice

The malicious falsehood claim was struck out in its entirety. The Court emphasised that malice must be pleaded with “scrupulous care and specificity” and that each particular relied upon must be more consistent with malice than with an innocent explanation.  

The Claimant’s pleadings failed this test. Allegations of post-publication conduct (such as refusing to amend the article) cannot establish a publisher’s state of mind at the time of original publication.  Allegations that the First Defendant “knew or ought to have known” something was untrue may amount to negligence, but fall short of the subjective dishonesty required for malice. Merely indicating a probability of malice is not sufficient to meet the statutory threshold. The Claimant pleaded that the cumulative narrative sufficiently establishes the case for malice, however, the Court reminded the Claimant that “malice cannot be pleaded additively”. Complaints of unfairness, imbalance or mockery similarly miss the target of dishonesty.  

3. The honest opinion defence

The Defendants obtained summary judgment on the entire libel claim on the basis that the Claimant had no real prospect of defeating an honest opinion defence under section 3 of the Defamation Act 2013.  

The Court analysed the four key elements of the defence:

1. Statement of opinion: The meanings pleaded by the Claimant that he was: involved in unlawful schemes, provided reckless advice, posed a risk to clients, and merited regulatory action, were all recognisable as expressions of opinion rather than statements of fact. The article was plainly “forthrightly-expressed op-ed journalism” and an ordinary reasonable reader would understand they were receiving the author’s opinions.
2. Basis of opinion indicated: The article was extensively reasoned, sourced and cross-referenced by hyperlink and footnote.  The basis for the opinions was clearly indicated in both general and specific terms.
3. Honest person test: The Court noted that the scope of opinions an honest person can hold is “extremely wide” – they may be unfair, prejudiced, unreasonable, or even spiteful, provided they are honest.  The Second Defendant’s opinions were supported by court judgments finding the Claimant’s legal arguments unarguable, and by regulatory findings against the schemes.
4. Opinions genuinely held: The Second Defendant provided witness evidence that he held the opinions expressed.  The judge concluded, based on the Second Defendant’s witness statement and the fact that the Claimant offered no contrary evidence, that she could not find that the opinions were not genuinely held.

4. Declaration of a statutory SLAPP

Mrs Justice Collins Rice then considered the Defendants’ alternative application for declaratory relief, commenting that the process of doing so “perhaps illustrates some of the complexity of the present statutory regime”. She made a declaration that the Claimant’s claim was a statutory SLAPP. This is the first occasion on which the High Court has applied the anti-SLAPP provisions of the ECCTA.

The statutory definition requires that: 

• the claimant's conduct restrains or is intended to restrain the defendant’s freedom of speech; 
• the information concerned has to do with economic crime; 
• any part of it is or would be made for a purpose related to combating economic crime; and
• the claimant’s conduct is intended to cause the defendant harassment, alarm, expense or any harm or inconvenience beyond that ordinarily encountered in properly conducted litigation.

On the economic crime element, the judge accepted the Second Defendant’s evidence that he had reason to suspect that cheating the public revenue may have occurred in connection with ineffective tax avoidance schemes, and believed that publishing the article would facilitate an investigation.  This met the statutory threshold.

The critical question was whether the Claimant’s conduct was intended to cause the defendants inconvenience beyond that to be expected in properly conducted litigation. The judge emphasised that failures of litigation competence do not by themselves make a claim a SLAPP – the test requires intentionality.  However, she held that the threshold for finding the Claimant’s intention for a statutory SLAPP was crossed in three respects:

(a) The Claimant made an ostensibly on-notice injunction application without putting the defendants on notice, suggesting this was deliberate rather than merely incompetent;

(b) The Claimant had demanded £8m in damages based on a contract entitlement that proved far lower when disclosed, with the apparent intention of having a chilling effect. The judge described the amount claimed as “spectacularly inflated” and further commented that the damaged claimed were “greater than any award of libel damages ever awarded in the UK”; and

(c) The Claimant used formal litigation procedures to try to compel disclosure of journalistic sources.  

Comment

This judgment provides valuable early guidance on the new SLAPP regime. Importantly, the Court made clear that a claim is not to be considered a SLAPP merely because it suffers from procedural errors, defective pleadings, or other failures of litigation competence. The statutory definition requires that a claimant intended to cause harm or inconvenience to a defendant beyond that to be expected in litigation ordinarily.  

In this case, Mrs Justice Collins Rice deemed the threshold met in light of the unwarranted degree of aggressive and improper pressure applied on the Defendants. She flagged that future cases requiring application of the statutory SLAPP regime would no doubt provide further guidance on the intentionality requirement. For the time being, she commented that the intentionality requirement in the SLAPP regime:

“occupies a space between negligence or incompetence on the one hand and calculated (or ‘strategic’) dishonesty on the other: the former is insufficient, and the latter unnecessary […] There may well be cases where what the conduct of a claimant evinces is best expressed as something like a reckless or wilful disregard for, or blindness to, the requirements and expectations of properly conducted litigation and the impact of their behaviour on a defendant.” 

Given that the finding of intention in this case was at a higher level, this area is ripe for further judicial consideration in appropriate cases in future.  

The decision demonstrates the courts’ willingness to dispose of weak defamation claims at an early stage where the honest opinion defence is clearly made out, and provides the first practical example of the SLAPP provisions being used to protect investigative journalism on matters of economic crime.  

The judgment is a useful example of how the court will analyse a claimant’s conduct against the new formulation of a statutory SLAPP in section 195 ECCTA. It underlines the importance of proper pleading in defamation cases, the high bar for alleging malice, and the risks of pursuing litigation that fails to comply with procedural requirements. Claimants should also be mindful that overstated damages claims and using court procedures to seek disclosure of journalistic sources may demonstrate the requisite intention to support a finding of a statutory SLAPP.

For further information, please email the authors or your usual CMS contact.

This article was co-authored by Alice Robson, Trainee Solicitor at CMS.