King Crude Carriers and construction contracts: can the prevention principle survive?
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In our earlier Legal Update (here) we considered the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in King Crude Carriers on construction contracts. In this article, we consider impact of the decision on a related area of construction law: the prevention principle. A number of similarities exist between the prevention principle and the deemed fulfilment principle discarded in King Crude Carriers. That case may now prompt consideration as to whether a similar challenge could be made to the prevention principle. In what follows, we consider the development of the prevention principle under English law and the grounds on which a challenge to the principle might be brought.
The development of the prevention principle
The classic modern statement of the prevention principle (as applied to construction contracts under English law) comes from Multiplex Constructions (UK) Ltd v Honeywell Control Systems Ltd (No. 2). Mr Justice Jackson (as he then was) summarised the principle as follows:
“The essence of the prevention principle is that the promisee cannot insist upon the performance of an obligation which he has prevented the promisor from performing.
In the field of construction law, one consequence of the prevention principle is that the employer cannot hold the contractor to a specified completion date, if the employer has by act or omission prevented the contractor from completing by that date. Instead, time becomes at large and the obligation to complete by the specified date is replaced by an implied obligation to complete within a reasonable time. The same principle applies as between main contractor and sub-contractor.
It is in order to avoid the operation of the prevention principle that many construction contracts and sub-contracts include provisions for extension of time. Thus, it can be seen that extension of time clauses exist for the protection of both parties to a construction contract or sub-contract.”
At first blush, the principle is a surprising one for English law to adopt. It results in the wholesale substitution of an agreed time for completion and liquidated damages regime with a general obligation to complete within a reasonable time without liquidated damages. This is the effect whether the prevention be for 1 day or 1 year. It is also unclear whether the principle is said to apply by way of a general principle of law or through implied terms.
To better understand the basis of the prevention principle under English law it is helpful to consider its development prior to Multiplex. The principle is usually dated back to Holme v Guppy in 1838. That case concerned the construction of a brewery. Carpenters were engaged to complete certain work within four and a half months with liquidated damages agreed at £40 per month. The carpenters were denied possession for four weeks, were delayed one week on their own account and a further four weeks by other contractors on site. They ultimately completed the works five weeks late. The lower court (then known as the “assizes”) had refused to allow liquidated damages for the whole of the five weeks, but referred to a higher court (the Court of Exchequer) the question of whether liquidated damages of £40 could be deducted on account of the one week of delay for which the carpenters were responsible. In refusing any deduction, Parke B noted that there were clear authorities that:
“if the party be prevented, by the refusal of the other contracting party, from completing the contract within the time limited, he is not liable in law for the default (1 Roll. Abr. 543; Com. Dig. Condition, L.(6)). It is clear, therefore, that the plaintiffs were excused from performing the agreement contained in the original contract; and there is nothing to shew that they entered into a new contract by which to perform the work in four months and a half, ending at a later period. The plaintiffs were therefore left at large; and consequently they are not to forfeit anything for the delay.”
It is apparent that the court considered the carpenters to be “excused from performing the agreement” in its entirety and there was no evidence to show that they had “entered into a new contract” to continue to perform the works in a different period. This appears to be the sense in which the court considered the carpenters to be “left at large”.
The authority cited by the court is Rolle’s Abridgement published in 1668 and Comyns’ Digest published in 1822. The relevant passages in Comyns refer back to cases noted Rolle’s which date from the 15th to 17th century.
The acts of prevention considered in Holme v Guppy were ones which were not authorised by the contract. The separate question of prevention arising from the exercise of powers expressly given to the employer or its agents was considered by the English Court of Appeal in Dodd v Churton (1897). The contract in that case provided for liquidated damages to accrue weekly in respect of any delays beyond the time for completion. It also provided for the employer’s architect to instruct variations and additions to the work which were stated not to vitiate the contract. The total contract sum was £664 and the contractor completed the works 27 weeks late. A variation worth £22 had been instructed by the architect and was said to have added 2 weeks of delay to the works. The employer therefore claimed only 25 weeks of liquidated damages.
The claim was rejected on the same basis as in Holme v Guppy with the court again quoting Comyns’. In the judgment of Chitty LJ:
“The case of Holme v Guppy and the subsequent cases in which that decision has been followed are merely examples of the well-known principle stated in Comyns' Digest, Condition L (6.), that, where performance of a condition has been rendered impossible by the act of the grantee himself, the grantor is exonerated from performance of it.”
It is notable that none of the judgments in Dodd seek to provide a rationale for the rule. The employer’s proposed solution of making due allowance for the additional time made necessary by the variation is not discussed. As a result, a variation valued at just over 3% of the total cost of the works and which accounted for only 7% of the total delay beyond completion allowed the contractor to escape liability for the remaining delay for which it was otherwise responsible. There is no mention in the case of any ability of the employer to bring an action for general damages based on a reasonable time to complete the works.
As a result of these cases, extension of time clauses became a ubiquitous feature of English law construction contracts, allowing employers to maintain both the benefits of a liquidated damages clause and contractual powers to instruct variations or take other action which might cause delay to the works. The development of the prevention principle in the context of construction contracts largely paused at this point. The next decision of note is the English Court of Appeal’s decision in Peak v McKinney in 1970.
In Peak, McKinney were responsible for defective foundation piling. When they finally came back to carry out the necessary remedial work, it took just 6 weeks to complete. However, the overall delay to the works was 58 weeks because, prior to the remedial works being carried out, Liverpool Corporation had delayed in deciding what they should do and how the problem should be rectified. There was an extension of time provision but it was limited, and the only relevant sub-clause referred to delays as a result of “any other unavoidable circumstances”. The Court of Appeal held that the delay resulting from the Corporation's indecision could not be said to have been an unavoidable circumstance. There was therefore no basis on which time could be extended as a result of the delays for which the Corporation were responsible and, in consequence, the court found that no liquidated damages could be levied. Lord Justice Salmon noted that in such circumstances, the employer: “is left to his ordinary remedy; that is to say, to recover such damages as he can prove flow from the contractor's breach.”
Lord Justice Salmon's reference to the employer's “ordinary remedy” was not explained further. However, two years later in Trollope & Colls Ltd v North West Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board, Denning MR in the Court of Appeal suggested that the prevention principle had the effect that:
“The time becomes at large. The work must be done within a reasonable time — that is, as a rule, the stipulated time plus a reasonable extension for the delay caused by his conduct.”
On appeal to the House of Lords on a separate issue, Lord Pearson disagreed with this extension of the principle and noted that Dodd v Churton did not afford any support to such a proposition.
The next Court of Appeal decision to revisit the prevention principle is Rapid Building Group v Ealing Family Housing Association Ltd, decided in 1983. The case concerned delays in giving possession due to the need to evict squatters. Whilst only 24 days of delay out of a total delay of 10 months were attributable to the squatters, the Court of Appeal felt bound to follow Peak in agreeing that the right to claim liquidated damages had become lost (the contractual extension of time clause did not cover delays to possession). However, in refusing summary judgment the Court held that the employer was still able to bring an unliquidated damages claim. Lord Justice Stephenson noted that:
“It is accepted that a party must elect whether to claim liquidated or unliquidated damages; but as it seems to me, where the claim for liquidated damages has been lost or has gone, as has been rightly held by the judge, the defendants are not precluded from pursuing their counterclaim for unliquidated damages.”
No mention is made in the judgments of time becoming at large or of there being substituted a reasonable time to complete.
It is worth noting that some of the judges in Peak and Rapid Building expressed surprise at the principle which had been presented to them. Lord Justice Phillimore in Peak noted that he was:
“somewhat startled when Mr Gardam said in the course of his argument that the moment any part of the delay which has occurred can be attributed to the employer, then any agreement as to liquidated damages disappears.”
Similarly, Lloyd LJ in Rapid Building was:
“somewhat startled to be told in the course of the argument that if any part of the delay was caused by the employer, no matter how slight, then the liquidated damages clause in the contract, clause 22, becomes inoperative.
I can well understand how that must necessarily be so in a case in which the delay is indivisible and there is a dispute as to the extent of the employer’s responsibility for that delay. But where there are, as it were, two separate and distinct periods of delay with two separate causes, and where the dispute relates only to one of those two causes, then it would seem to me just and convenient that the employer should be able to claim liquidated damages in relation to the other period.”
He went on to note that he would have adopted such an approach in the case before him, by allowing the employer to claim for liquidated damages for the full 10 months of delay less the 24 days of delay due to squatters, were it not for the earlier Court of Appeal decision in Peak.
Multiplex and Cyden
The above summary brings us chronologically back to the Multiplex decision and Jackson J’s (as he then was) assertion that the prevention principle, in addition to preventing the recovery of liquidated damages, sets time “at large and the obligation to complete by the specified date is replaced by an implied obligation to complete within a reasonable time.”
The foregoing summary suggests there is scant support for such a broad principle in the English authorities. Indeed, a previous attempt to extend the principle in this way by Lord Denning in Trollope had been expressly disapproved of by Lord Pearson in the House of Lords.
However, some support for the formulation in Multiplex has emerged in the most recent Court of Appeal decision to consider the principle, North Midland Building Ltd v Cyden Homes Ltd, decided in 2018. The issue in that case was whether a clause excluding extensions of time for concurrent delay offended the prevention principle. The court rejected an argument that the prevention principle operated independently of the terms of the parties’ contract. In the court’s judgment:
“the prevention principle is not an overriding rule of public or legal policy. There is no authority for such a proposition: it is not expressed in those terms in Multiplex or any of the other authorities noted above. … I do not consider that it is analogous to the rule which strikes down liquidated damages as a penalty, a rule which has an entirely different legal provenance.”
Instead, the Court considered that the principle operated by way of implied terms, which were capable of exclusion by express terms such as the concurrent delay clause agreed in the case before it. Lord Justice Coulson (with whom the other members of the court agreed), noted that:
“the fact that the mechanism of implied terms does not help the appellant on the particular facts of this case does not mean that such terms are not the right vehicle by which, in a conventional case, the prevention principle is given contractual force. In one sense, that is what Merton v Leach was doing: making acts of hindrance and prevention breaches of implied terms of the contract, thereby setting time at large. Moreover, when time is set at large, the obligation to complete by a fixed date is replaced with an implied obligation to complete within a reasonable time (see paragraph 48 of Multiplex). In my view, therefore, the prevention principle can only sensibly operate by way of implied terms.”
A critique
The broad thrust of the cases referred to in above has been to treat the prevention principle as a general principle of law. The courts in Holme and Dodd referred only to the bare rule taken from Comyn’s Digest. Subsequent cases, including Peak, Rapid Building and Multiplex, have simply restated and applied the rule from Dodd that any delay caused by the employer to completion (without a corresponding entitlement to an extension of time) will render a liquidated damages clause inoperable. There is no discussion in those cases of implied terms.
Taken as a general principle of law, however, the prevention principle is difficult to justify. The passage from Comyns’ Digest referred to in in Holme and Dodd was written in 1820 and is itself based on cases decided more than 400 years ago. That was a time when general English law principles of implied terms had not been developed. The rule as stated in Comyns’ therefore represents a response to certain factual scenarios, but not any developed principle of law.
As a general principle, it is also ill-defined because even in Dodd it was accepted that the rule could be excluded by express words to the contrary. This had already occurred in the St Johns College case (decided in 1870), where liquidated damages were upheld despite the ordering of variations and the absence of any extension of time mechanism. The variation provision in Dodd was held not to be sufficiently clear for this purpose, but there is no discussion of how a general principle of this nature could have the effect of making the exercise of a contractual power (i.e. to order variations) render inoperative a separate contractual provision in the same contract (i.e. the liquidated damages provision).
As noted above, the inadequacy of treating the prevention principle as a general principle of law has now been accepted by the Court of Appeal in Cyden. However, the implied term justification for the broad formulation of the prevention principle described in that case also poses a number of questions.
The leading authority on implied terms is Marks and Spencer plc v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd. In that case the Supreme Court confirmed the following test (originally set out in the Privy Council’s decision in the BP Refinery case):
“[F]or a term to be implied, the following conditions (which may overlap) must be satisfied: (1) it must be reasonable and equitable; (2) it must be necessary to give business efficacy to the contract, so that no term will be implied if the contract is effective without it; (3) it must be so obvious that 'it goes without saying'; (4) it must be capable of clear expression; (5) it must not contradict any express term of the contract.”
One initial difficulty is that a number of different ways of formulating an implied term in relation to the prevention principle are possible. Potential candidates include:
- An implied condition precedent to a liquidated damages clause which prevents any damages from accruing if delays to completion have been caused by employer acts of prevention for which there is no entitlement to an extension of time.
- An implied right to extend the time for completion for employer acts of prevention causing delay to completion.
- An implied qualification that no liquidated damages can be recovered for any period of delay for which the employer is responsible.
The existence of multiple potential solutions poses an obstacle to the implication of a term due to the requirements for obviousness and clear expression. As noted by the Court of Appeal in Philips Electronique Grand Public SA v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd (and approved in Marks and Spencer):
“[I]t is not enough to show that had the parties foreseen the eventuality which in fact occurred they would have wished to make provision for it, unless it can also be shown either that there was only one contractual solution or that one of several possible solutions would without doubt have been preferred ...”
A further difficulty is necessity. Employer acts of prevention, unless authorised by the contract, will usually be breaches of the implied terms of co-operation and non-hindrance which are commonly implied into construction contracts. In such cases, the contractor would have a right to reclaim any liquidated damages from the employer, effectively cancelling out the liquidated damages. This may point against the necessity for implying any broader term disabling the entirety of the liquidated damages regime or substituting a reasonable time for completion. A similar point arises in relation to acts of prevention authorised by the contract: implied rights falling short of the full extent of the current prevention principle may be sufficient to adequately protect the contractor (i.e. such as an implied right to an extension of time). Support for this position can also be seen in relation to the operation of the prevention principle in claims for demurrage under charterparty contracts. Laytime and/or demurrage is suspended for delays to loading or unloading caused by the fault of the shipowner, but the right to demurrage remains intact for other delays and time is not set at large: see Triton Navigation Limited v Vitol SA.
Another difficulty arises from the need for any implied term to avoid contradicting the express terms of the contract. An implied term which forms a pre-condition or qualification to the liquidated damages clause could be said to be contradictory. Similar criticisms may apply to the suggestion (from Cyden) that “the obligation to complete by a fixed date is replaced with an implied obligation to complete within a reasonable time”. The wholesale replacement of an express clause with an implied obligation seems difficult to square with the rule that implied terms must not contradict express terms.
Finally, it is worth noting that any implied term giving effect to the prevention principle (or parts of it) is likely to depend on the terms of the contract in question and the circumstances of each individual case. The requirements of necessity and obviousness may be met in one case and not in another.
King Crude Carriers
The Supreme Court’s decision in King Crude Carriers discussed in our previous Legal Article (see here) would appear to support the above critique.
The deemed fulfilment principle from Mackay v Dick has parallels with the prevention principle. Both principles concern acts of prevention and a supposed transformation of contractual obligations which is said to arise as a result. In the deemed fulfilment principle, a condition precedent is taken to have been satisfied, whereas in the prevention principle a party is taken to have been, as described in Dodd, “exonerated from performance” of a “condition”. On the broader formulation of the prevention principle, the act of prevention transforms the agreed date for completion into an obligation to complete within a reasonable time, not unlike the transformation which occurs under the deemed fulfilment principle, allowing conditional benefits to be claimed without fulfilment of the stated condition. In the words of the court in Peak, the prevention principle results in the “stipulated time for completion having ceased to be applicable” in a similar way as a condition precedent ceases to be applicable under the deemed fulfilment principle.
Many of the reasons given by the Supreme Court for rejecting the deemed fulfilment principle apply either directly or in modified form to the prevention principle:
- Although not borrowed from the civil law, the prevention principle – particularly in its broader form – does not have clear support in the early English authorities. Even in its narrower form expressed in Dodd, the principle appears to have been derived from a handful of 15th to 17th century cases whose facts and reasoning (if any) have never been considered.
- The English authorities do not speak with one voice. Certain judges noted above have expressed reservations as to the principle (in Peak, Trollope and Rapid Building), as have other judges writing extra-judicially (see, for example, a presentation given by Mr Justice Ramsey to the Society of Construction Law on 3 April 2012). Some authorities treat the principle as one operating generally, whereas others treat it as a result of the implication of terms.
- The principle may be at odds with more established principles of law in relation to the implication of terms, such as the requirement for necessity and to avoid conflict with express terms.
- The rule promotes legal fictions such as completion being “excused” (Comyns), the contractor being “exonerated” (Dodd), the “stipulated time for completion having ceased to be applicable” (Peak), or an obligation to complete within a reasonable time to which the parties have not agreed (Multiplex and Cyden).
- The better approach is to proceed on the basis of the terms of the contract, express and implied, and their proper interpretation. As noted in King Crude, this “is consistent with the importance which English law attaches to freedom of contract” and “promotes certainty and predictability, which are important considerations, especially in the commercial law context.”
- The rejection of the prevention principle in its present form would not lead to injustice. To the contrary, the present rule enables a contractor to escape the contractual consequences of its own delays in circumstances where only minor delays have been caused by acts of prevention for which there is no corresponding extension of time. The alternative approach mooted above, which utilises implied terms specifically targeted to the acts of prevention in question, would allow the agreed terms to remain intact whilst protecting the contractor against having to pay liquidated damages in respect of such acts of prevention.
Given the various Court of Appeal cases referred to above, any challenge to the prevailing formulation of the prevention principle is likely to require the involvement of the Supreme Court. The decision in King Crude Carriers may provide the encouragement necessary to achieve that end.
References:
Holme v Guppy (1838) 150 ER 1195
Jones v St. John's College (1870) LR 6 QB 115
Dodd v Churton [1897] 1 QB 562
Peak v McKinney (1970) 1 BLR 111
Trollope & Colls Ltd v North West Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board [1973] 1 WLR 601
Rapid Building Group v Ealing Family Housing Association Ltd (1984) 29 BLR 5
Triton Navigation Limited v Vitol SA [2003] EWCA Civ 1715
Multiplex Constructions (UK) Ltd v Honeywell Control Systems Ltd (No. 2) [2007] EWHC 447 (TCC)
Marks and Spencer plc v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd (Rev 1) [2015] UKSC 72
North Midland Building Ltd v Cyden Homes Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 1744
King Crude Carriers SA v Ridgebury November LLC (Rev1) [2025] UKSC 39