Law Society v Sephton & Co & Others [2006] UKHL 22
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Section 2 Limitation Act 1980; accrual of cause of action in tort; meaning of “damage”
There have recently been a number of high profile cases which have sought to bring much needed clarity to the operation of the Limitation Act 1980. In one of these, Law Society v Sephton, the House of Lords (led by Lord Hoffman) considered the meaning of “damage” within Section 2 of the Act and, in particular, whether a cause of action in tort accrued when the Claimant incurred a contingent or an actual liability.
Background
The case originated from the misappropriation of client funds by a solicitor, a Mr Payne. Mr Payne misappropriated his clients’ money and managed to avoid detection for over six years.
In accordance with the Solicitors’ Account Rules, Mr Payne had his books and accounts annually audited by a firm of qualified accountants, Sephton & Co (“Sephton”). From 1989 to 1995, Sephton negligently certified to the Law Society that Mr Payne’s accounts complied with these rules. The Law Society relied on such certificates, in the sense that, if the report had not been delivered or had indicated that something was amiss, the Law Society would have investigated the position and discovered the theft of client funds.
In April 1996, a client of Mr Payne’s complained to the Law Society about a delay in payment. This complaint triggered an investigation by the Law Society in May 1996. The investigation revealed a deficiency in Mr Payne’s client account to the value of £750,000 and the practice was intervened.
The Law Society, under its discretionary scheme, made compensation payments of approximately £1.25 million to clients of Mr Payne. The first claim was made in July 1996 and the first payment was issued in October of the same year.
In October 1996, the Law Society formally notified Sephton that it would hold it liable for compensation to Mr Payne’s clients following their negligent preparation/assessment of Mr Payne’s annual accounts.
There was a delay in issuing the claim form, as the Law Society concluded related litigation (Law Society v KPMG Peat Marwick) to establish whether a firm of accountants who provided it with annual certifications owed it a duty of care. Upon receipt of a favourable judgment (and after avenues of appeal had been extinguished), the Law Society issued a claim form against Sephton. The claim form was issued in May 2002.
Sephton argued that the Law Society was time barred from pursuing a claim against it as the cause of action arose before 16 May 1996. Sephton alleged that the Law Society suffered damage from the dates of each misappropriation following submission of the accountant’s annual certificates. Such misappropriations gave the client a right to make a claim on the fund and Sephton contended that liability in respect of such a claim was “damage” for the purposes of Section 2.
The Law Society contended that, even though it was faced with claims under its compensation scheme arising out of the solicitor’s negligence, it did not suffer any actual damage until it resolved (under its discretionary scheme) to make the first payment out of the compensation fund to a former client of Mr Payne.
The Law Society put forward a reasoned argument as to why it did not suffer any damage until it had received an actual claim. If the solicitor’s misappropriations had been repaid and/or set off against other client accounts (as had occurred in the past), the Law Society would not have been liable to these claims. As such, it argued that knowledge of a potential liability to a potential claim was not enough to start time running.
The first instance decision
At first instance, Mr Michael Briggs QC (sitting as a deputy judge in the Chancery Division) ruled against the Law Society on the grounds that a cause of action had accrued before 16 May 1996 (when it was aware of the accountant’s negligence). Accordingly, Sephton were able to rely on a limitation defence.
The decisions of the Court of Appeal and House of Lords
Both the Court of Appeal and then the House of Lords found in favour of the Law Society on the basis that a cause of action could not (and did not) accrue until the Society had suffered a quantifiable loss in consequence of the solicitor’s negligence, i.e. when the first claim on the compensation fund was received. Thus, their Lordships rejected the Society’s argument that the cause of action did not accrue until the first claim was paid by the compensation fund.
Lord Hoffman delivered the leading judgment.
After reviewing and citing his opinion on a number of earlier cases, including Forster v Outred & Co [1982] and Nykredit Mortgage Bank plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd (No 2) [1997], Lord Hoffman’s view was that incurring the possibility of a future liability to make a payment was not a sufficient basis upon which to make a claim as no actual loss had occurred. He said:
“A contingent liability is not, as such, damage until the contingency occurs. The existence of a contingent liability may depress the value of other property…or it may mean that a party to a bilateral transaction has received less that he should have done, or is worse off than if he had not entered into the transaction….But, standing alone, as in this case, the contingency is not damage.”
Accordingly, it was not sufficient that the Law Society was at risk of having to meet claims arising from the solicitor’s theft of client funds, even if that risk was real and likely. The possibility of an obligation to pay money in the future was not, of itself, “damage” for the purposes of section 2.
Commentary
- Law Society v Sephton provides helpful clarity to a central aspect of the Limitation Act 1980, namely when a cause of action accrues in tort and when the time in which to bring such a claim begins to run. The House of Lords unanimously decided that a cause of action accrues in tort from the point when a quantifiable/ascertainable loss is suffered; a contingent liability is not enough to start time running.
- The position contrasts with cases where actual damage occurred at an earlier date. Thus in Foster v Outred [1982] the property in question had been mortgaged; in Knapp v Ecclesiastical Insurance Group plc [1998], a policy of insurance was voidable owing to a broker’s non-disclosure; and in Khan v Falvey [2002] a solicitor’s negligence meant that his client’s claim was susceptible to a strike out for want of prosecution.
- The House of Lords decision, whilst having broader application in certain circumstances, does not represent a radical departure from the courts’ general approach to issues of limitation. Lord Hoffman cited with approval the principle enunciated by Lord Nicholls in Nykredit [1997], in which he said that “within the bands of sense and reasonableness, the policy of the law should be to advance, rather than retard, the accrual of a cause of action”. Accordingly, Sephton is largely a decision on its particular facts.
- Much of the case law on limitation in recent years has concerned the interpretation of s.14A Limitation Act 1980, under which a claimant has a period of three years from date of “knowledge” (as defined) to bring a claim in tort (as to which see, the preceeding article on Haward v Fawcetts. In Sephton, s.14A would have been of no assistance to the Law Society, as they had the requisite knowledge for approximately six years prior to the commencement of proceedings.
This case first appeared in the Solicitors' risk awareness bulletin in November 2006, to view the full publication please click here.
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