Structure of supply sector
2.4.1 Since the complete opening of the electricity market on 1 July 2007, all French consumers may choose their electricity supplier. The historical incumbent energy suppliers, i.e. EDF and the ELDs, still dominate this sector, selling 91% of the quantities delivered to end users. Alternative energy suppliers exist but are still marginal. These include ENGIE Direct Energie and Enercoop.
2.4.2 Only the historical suppliers (EDF and the ELDs, each of them in its traditional area) are allowed to offer contracts with regulated tariffs (determined by the government). Otherwise, all the suppliers must compete with market offers (where the prices are freely determined through bilateral negotiations between the supplier and the customer). Pursuant to the current transition period introduced by Loi NOME, dated 7 December 2010, non-domestic customers continue to benefit from regulated tariffs. During this time, regulated tariffs, based on the recommendation of the CRE, are set by the Ministers in charge of Energy and Economy. After 7 December 2015 (the end of the transition period), the CRE will submit proposals to the Ministers and, after 31 December 2015, the regulated tariffs will be limited to small and mainly domestic customers (all customers in Corsica and “overseas departments”).
Competition
2.4.3 Pursuant to Law No. 2006-1537 of 7 December 2006 concerning the energy sector, the CRE is responsible for the wholesale markets. This task was extended by Law No. 2010-1249 of 22 October 2010 on financial and banking regulation to transactions made between the entities operating in the CO2 market.
2.4.4 This surveillance is now implemented in accordance with the European regulation, “REMIT”, No. 1227/2011, which entered into force on 28 December 2011, on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency.
2.4.5 The CRE examines the development of competition in the retail market and the relationship between the bid price and the price of the ARENH (see paragraph 2.5.2).
Applicability of EU competition law
2.4.6 While the strict application of European competition law is certainly not sufficient to open electricity markets to competition, such laws nonetheless play a decisive role in strengthening competition in the French markets.
2.4.7 The Commission makes full use of its powers, as emphasised by cases concerning the concentration between EDF and EnBW (Decision dated 7 February 2001 No. COMP/M.1853), and between EDF and Hidrocantabrico (Decision dated 19 March 2002 No. 4064/89).
Basic laws and regulations
2.4.8 The basic laws and regulations concerning wholesale and retail competition are set out in the Commercial Code (Book IV) as well as in the French Energy Code (only the legislative part has currently been published), and in the Consumption Code.
Authorities
2.4.9 French competition rules are basically identical to those applicable under EU competition law. The main categories of abuse of dominant position are predatory pricing, restraining the commercial independence of customers or retailers and creating barriers to market entry.
2.4.10 Preventing and/or punishing anti-competitive practices in the electricity sector falls under the competence of the Autorité de la concurrence (National Competition Authority).
Anti-Cartel
2.4.11 Under article L.420-1 of the Commercial Code:
“common actions, agreements, express or tacit undertakings or coalitions are prohibited, particularly when they are intended to: restrict access to the market or the free exercise of competition by other undertakings; prevent the setting of prices by free competition on the market through artificial increase or reduction; limit or control production, market outlets, investments or technical developments; apportion markets or the sources of supply; even through the direct or indirect intermediation of a company of the group established outside France, if the aim or the effect is to prevent, restrict or distort free competition on a market”.
Anti-Trust
2.4.12 Article L.420-2 of the Commercial Code prohibits the abuse of a dominant position by an undertaking or group of undertakings with a dominant position on the internal market or a substantial part of it. Such abuse may in particular consist of refusals to sell, coercive tied selling or discriminatory conditions of sale as well as breach of established commercial relations solely due to a partner’s refusal to submit to unjustified trading conditions. The same provision forbids an undertaking or group of undertakings abusing the position of economic dependence of a client or a supplier - such abuse may consist of refusals to sell, coercive tied selling, discriminatory practice or range agreements.
2.4.13 These anti-cartel and anti-trust provisions apply in the energy sector. For instance on 25 March 2009, the French Competition Authority issued a decision imposing a fine of EUR 320,000 to “Gaz and Electricité de Grenoble”, a local semi-public company jointly owned by the city of Grenoble, Suez Energie Services and other energy suppliers. This company was found to have abused its dominant position in the market for the supply of electricity to small businesses in 2005 (Decision No. 09-D-14).
Merger control
2.4.14 The French merger control regime is governed by the provisions of Book IV of the Commercial Code as amended by the Law on the Modernisation of the Economy, enacted on 4 August 2008 and Decree No. 2008-1161 dated 14 November 2008. Since 2 March 2009, mergers, acquisitions, take-overs and joint-ventures over the turnover thresholds require an authorisation from the French Competition Authority, which is independent.
2.4.15 According to Article L. 430-2 of the French Commercial Code, a merger must be notified to the French Competition Authority when the following three conditions are met:
- the combined aggregate worldwide turnover, exclusive of tax, of all of the companies or groups of natural persons or legal entities involved in the merger is greater than EUR 150m;
- the combined aggregate turnover exclusive of tax achieved in France by at least two of the companies or groups of natural persons or legal entities concerned is greater than EUR 50m; and
- the operation does not fall under the scope of Council Regulation No. 139/2004 (EC) of 20 January 2004, i.e. it is not a merger with a European dimension.
2.4.16 Such a decision of the French Competition Authority can be challenged before the French Administrative Supreme Court (Conseil d’Etat) within two months of its notification.
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