Navigating the Orbital Superhighway: Satellite collisions and the lack of a legal framework

Look up on a clear night. The satellites sliding overhead are part of a fast‑crowding high‑risk orbital superhighway. In 2024, SpaceX’s Starlink alone executed more than 50,000 collision‑avoidance manoeuvres, a number unthinkable only a few years ago. With more than ten thousand active satellites now circling the planet and delivering broadband, GPS, weather and military capabilities the pace and density are turning low Earth orbit into a high‑stakes traffic system moving at roughly 28,000 kilometres per hour. In that regime one crash can seed a debris cloud that multiplies risk in a feedback loop known as Kessler Syndrome.

This is not theoretical. An Iridium satellite collided with a defunct military satellite in 2009, and the fragments remain in orbit. If this were aviation you would expect a global controller like ICAO. Instead we have a patchwork. U.S. Space Command shares tracking data, the EU runs EUSST and others keep their cards close. Operators often rely on voluntary calls and emails when seconds count. There is no binding standard for who manoeuvres first, what is shared or when to move and every incident makes the next one more likely.

The legal framework is still vintage space age. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty outlaws nuclear arms but says nothing about right of way, and the 1972 Liability Convention decides who pays only after something breaks. There is no duty to prevent the breakage. Security makes transparency harder. Militaries will unlikely share precise orbits, dual‑use systems disclose the bare minimum and proximity operations or “inspector” satellites blur the line between routine and hostile. Commercial satellites may not be entirely neutral either. If they carry battlefield communications or sensing they may be viewed as fair game, turning a collision risk into a geopolitical flashpoint.

There are signs of progress. The UN OEWG is drafting behavioural norms, the EU and U.S. are exploring civil space‑traffic management and industry is trialling automated deconfliction. We should advocate for a bolder rules‑based orbital order: mandatory manoeuvre co‑ordination, real‑time ephemeris sharing with privacy guardrails and liability shields for good‑faith disclosures, with the private sector at the table. In parallel contracts across the satellite supply chain should tighten liability limits, add arbitration to protect sensitive technology and tailor risk allocations to collision scenarios.

The takeaway is simple and urgent. Without enforceable norms and shared responsibility across governments and companies the next bad day in orbit is not a question of if but when.