From pixels to property: The emergence of in‑game virtual assets as criminal “property” in R v Lakeman

In a recent landmark decision, the Criminal Court of Appeal in R v Lakeman [2026] EWCA Crim 4 held, for the first time on appeal in England, that an in-video game currency could fall within the definition of “property” for the purposes of the Theft Act 1968 (the “the Theft Act” ).

While the decision is narrowly framed in criminal law, it is a significant milestone in the treatment of virtual assets. While the Court emphasised that the determination of what constitutes “property” under the Theft Act is not dictated by private law definitions, the reasoning, which includes analysis of civil law criteria for property, may influence civil courts considering proprietary claims in respect of digital assets.

Background and Relevant Law

The case arose from allegations that the Defendant, a former content developer at Jagex (developer of Runescape), unlawfully accessed 68 player accounts and transferred approximately 705 billion in-game gold pieces to third parties in exchange for Bitcoin and fiat currency, with an estimated real-world value of £543,123. The Defendant was charged with, among other offences, theft under section 1(1) of the Theft Act and money laundering under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.

The Theft Act defines theft as the dishonest appropriation of property belonging to another, with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it. Section 4 of the Theft Act defines “property” as including:

“money and all other property, real or personal, including things in action and other intangible property.”

At the Crown Court, the Defendant initially succeeded in applying to dismiss the theft charges, arguing that Runescape gold pieces were not property because they were analogous to pure information and lacked the characteristic of “rivalrousness.” The Prosecution was subsequently permitted to appeal.

Issues Before the Court of Appeal

The central question before the Court of Appeal was whether gold pieces, an in-game currency, could be considered “property” under the Theft Act.

Popplewell LJ emphasised that criminal law and civil law may treat “property” differently without conflict. For example, Class A drugs can be stolen under the Theft Act, but civil law would not recognise any proprietary rights in them due to public policy. Similarly, even where principles or cases from civil law were cited, these were helpful but not determinative of the criminal law issue.

Whereas the criminal law is chiefly concerned with the social harm of dishonest deprivation, the role of the civil courts is to determine proprietary rights enforceable against third parties. Given the vast disparity between the rights of a victim in criminal litigation, as against the rights of a claimant in civil, an inconsistent approach by the courts raises the question of whether it is just, or defensible as a matter of public policy, that the same individual could be found to be the victim of the crime of theft in the criminal courts, but unable to seek recovery of the same property in the civil courts.

The Court’s Decision

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the gold pieces are “property” for the purposes of the Theft Act. Key elements of the Court’s reasoning included:

• The Theft Act definition is intended to have a wide ambit, capturing anything that could be appropriated dishonestly, and this extended to digital assets such as in-game currency.
• The gold pieces were not merely knowledge or information; like cryptocurrencies, they were distinct from the underlying code and existed independently of the minds of players.
• There was no policy reason to exclude them, given their real-world and in-game economic value. Transfers, even if prohibited by the terms of service, did not prevent them from being property.

The Court went further in obiter comments, considering how the gold pieces fit the Ainsworth criteria for property in civil law (National Provincial Bank v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175):

• Definable.
• Identifiable by third parties.
• Capable of assumption by third parties.
• Permanent or stable to some degree.

Only the final criterion was challenged, with the Court noting that even limited permanence (analogous to a melting ice lolly or burning match) suffices.

Rivalrousness

A key feature of the judgment was the Court’s discussion of rivalrousness, a concept increasingly used in civil law to determine whether digital assets can constitute property (see the Law Commission, Report on Digital Assets, 2023).

The Court noted that rivalrousness was not required for criminal property recognition under the Theft Act. Nevertheless, it found that the Runescape gold pieces were rivalrous in practice:

• They exist independently of individuals’ minds.
• Use by one player prejudices use by another.
• Once consumed, the pieces cannot be used by anyone else.
• Exclusive control is ensured by usernames and passwords.

The Court highlighted that infinite supply or platform control (Jagex could alter or revoke assets) did not prevent criminal recognition. This is conceptually similar to fiat currency, which could hypothetically be devalued or withdrawn by the Bank of England.  Neither did it stop the gold pieces from being rivalrous before any such alteration or revocation – it was the use or consumption of the property which must be rivalrous, not the mere possession of it.

Commentary and Implications

Lakeman illustrates the continuing distinction between criminal and civil property. The approach of the civil courts remains one determined by the conceptual and contractual limitations of proprietary rights in platform-controlled assets, while the decision of the court in Lakeman indicates a focus in the criminal courts on the broader reach of criminal statute, and the public policy objective of preventing the social harm of dishonest appropriation.

Nonetheless, the Court’s reasoning on Ainsworth criteria and rivalrousness may prove persuasive in civil claims, offering a conceptual foundation for arguing that certain digital assets satisfy proprietary requirements.

Parallels with cryptocurrencies are notable: these intangible assets are now widely accepted as property in criminal and civil law, despite reliance on digital code. While in-game currencies lack blockchain verification, Lakeman shows that even platform-dependent, digitally defined assets can constitute property under the Theft Act.

Lakeman represents a step toward recognition of a wider range of digital assets as property and may well influence future civil litigation and asset recovery in the rapidly evolving virtual economy.

This article has been prepared with the assistance of Gemma Watson.