1. Has your national competition authority published guidelines on competition compliance programmes (“CCPs”)? If so, what are the key components of an effective CCP?
  2. Are there any recent cases in your jurisdiction where the NCA/competent courts have discussed the impact of CCPs?
  4. Has the role of the management and/or employees of the company been assessed with respect to preventing, participating in, detecting and reporting violations, or remediating violations? Is there a link between the role of the company's management and/or employees and an effective CCP?
  5. Has the fact that an undertaking has a CCP been helpful in reducing a fine for an infringement of competition law? What facts, arguments or commitments were used to justify the reduction and what is the maximum reduction that can be granted? If a reduction is not granted, why not?
  6. Are CCPs (their adoption or updating) used as evidence for "self-cleaning" measures when an economic operator risks being excluded from a public procurement procedure for collusive behaviour?
  7. Please indicate any additional considerations / rules, trends that are important in your country in relation to CCPs.
  8. Are there legal developments on the horizon in relation to CCPs?

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Hungary
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1. Has your national competition authority published guidelines on competition compliance programmes (“CCPs”)? If so, what are the key components of an effective CCP?

The Hungarian Competition Authority (“Hungarian NCA”) does not have dedicated guidelines specifically addressing competition compliance programs (“CCPs”). However, CCPs are covered by the Hungarian NCA’s notice on fine calculation in antitrust cases (“Fine Notice”).

Specifically, under the Fine Notice, CCPs may be taken into account as fine reduction factors. However, the mere existence of a CCP is not sufficient for a fine reduction. Instead, the company must also (i) demonstrate that it has made adequate compliance efforts, (ii) cease the infringing conduct once it has been discovered, and (iii) objectively and credibly demonstrate that the cessation of the infringement was due to or related to a CCP that the company voluntarily implemented or that was imposed on it by the Hungarian NCA in a previous procedure.

Additionally, as per the Fine Notice, the Hungarian NCA will assess CCPs based on the following conditions:

  • Clear, firm, and public commitment of the company’s management bodies and all its officials to comply with competition rules;
  • Availability of human and financial resources necessary for the effective implementation of the CCP;
  • Measures to ensure that employees are informed, trained, and aware of the CCP;
  • Effective signalling systems, monitoring and control mechanisms (including sanctions for serious breaches of the CCP);      
  • Feedback and continuous improvement of the CCP on the basis of experience.

In general, ex ante compliance measures can lead to more substantial fine reduction than ex post measures implemented or offered following the initiation of the Hungarian NCA’s investigation.

CCPs can also lead to fine reduction in consumer protection cases.

2. Are there any recent cases in your jurisdiction where the NCA/competent courts have discussed the impact of CCPs?

There are multiple examples where CCPs were considered in antitrust cases. However, their impact was not discussed in detail.

For instance:

  • In 2022, multiple dealers of musical instruments engaged in price fixing were granted a 5% fine reductions for implementing ex post CCPs;
  • In 2021, a participant in a public procurement cartel was also granted a 5% fine reduction for developing and implementing a CCP during the Hungarian NCAs procedure.

3. What arguments have been taken into account in relation to a CCP? Has the fact that a company has a CCP been assessed in terms of the effort made or the results achieved, i.e. the efficiency of the programme? Is the focus on future changes in CCPs or on existing programmes?

For relevant arguments generally considered by the Hungarian NCA, refer to Question No. 1 above.

In general, both ex ante and ex post CCPs may be considered by the Hungarian NCA as fine reduction factors, however, ex ante CCPs are usually given more weight. Additionally, ex ante CCPs can lead to higher fine reduction if their efficiency can be proved – for instance, if the company can provide substantial new evidence to the Hungarian NCA and prove that the CCP contributed to the discovery/identification of the evidence.

The Hungarian NCA emphasised that a key factor in assessing CCPs is the clear, unequivocal, and public commitment of the company’s management and all its officials to adhere to competition rules. This underscores the special responsibility of the management, whose involvement in any infringement can significantly impact the potential consideration of CCPs as a mitigating factor.

Specifically, there is an express requirement that senior company executives must not have been involved in the infringement for CCPs to be considered. In other words, if any such executives participated in the infringement, any existing ex ante CCPs cannot be considered as a fine reduction factor at all, and it is also unlikely that ex post CCPs would be considered.

5. Has the fact that an undertaking has a CCP been helpful in reducing a fine for an infringement of competition law? What facts, arguments or commitments were used to justify the reduction and what is the maximum reduction that can be granted? If a reduction is not granted, why not?

In line with the above, under the Hungarian NCA’s Fine Notice, CCPs may be considered as fine reduction factors.

As mentioned above, ex ante CCPs can lead to higher fine reductions, if they meet the relevant general criteria (see Question No. 1 above) and senior company executives have not taken part in the infringement. In that case, the Fine Notice foresees fine reductions of up to 7%. Additionally, if the company can provide substantial new evidence to the Hungarian NCA and prove that the CCP contributed to the discovery/identification of the evidence, the fine reduction can be as high as 10%.

On the other hand, ex post CCPs (i.e. usually commitments to develop and implements CCPs offered after the initiation of the Hungarian NCA’s procedure) can lead to a 5% fine reduction at most, provided that it is coupled with participation in a leniency policy, settlement procedure, and/or compensation. In this case, if the Hungarian NCA finds the CCP acceptable, it can impose it as an obligation in its final decision and monitor its implementation in the framework of a follow-up investigation.

6. Are CCPs (their adoption or updating) used as evidence for "self-cleaning" measures when an economic operator risks being excluded from a public procurement procedure for collusive behaviour?

Yes.

A company subject to a tender ban may be exempted before the expiry of the full 3-year duration by a decision of the Public Procurement Authority under a so-called self-cleaning procedure. In the framework of the procedure, the company is also required to verify establishment of a CCP that can prevent future infringements as a pre-requisite for the exemption.

In addition to antitrust cases, CCPs may also be considered as fine reduction factors in consumer protection cases. In such cases, the Hungarian NCA follows a more lenient approach. For instance, while the Fine Notice applicable to antirust cases imposes a strict cap on fine reductions in antitrust cases (i.e. capped at 10% in case of ex ante CCPs), there is no such fixed limit for consumer protection cases, potentially allowing for reductions of up to 100% in case of ex ante CCPs. In case of ex post CCPs, there is a cap outlined in the relevant notice, however, still higher than in antitrust cases (i.e. 20% if coupled with compensation or admission of liability, 5% in the absence thereof). 

We are not aware of any forthcoming legal developments concerning CCPs.